

Savings and Consumption Responses to Persistent Income Shocks

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Abstract

This paper studies consumption and savings responses to persistent income shocks. We identify an unexpected and persistent shock to disposable income following a divergence in the two main types of adjustable rate mortgages in Ireland in 2010. We use linked mortgage and bank account data to estimate the savings response to this shock, as well as heterogeneity across individuals who differ by initial liquid assets and by the length of the shock. We find that the implied marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) are high on average (91 percent), decreasing in liquid assets, and increasing in the length of the shock. We match the average response in a standard consumption-savings model with a 68 quarter income shock, which is the same length as the remaining maturity of mortgages in our data. The model performs well in matching the liquid asset heterogeneity and less well for the shock length heterogeneity. We conclude that the standard model performs better in matching empirical MPCs for persistent income shocks than for transitory income shocks.

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The permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) has two central predictions about the response of consumption to unexpected income shocks. The first is that consumption should respond very little when the shock is transitory and the second is that consumption should respond almost one-for-one when the shock is very persistent. The literature has repeatedly tested the first hypothesis and shown that it fails (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010, 2017; Kaplan and Violante, 2022) because household consumption in fact responds strongly to transitory shocks. This paper tests the second hypothesis, on which the literature has much less evidence, and it finds that the permanent income hypothesis performs better. Consumption indeed responds almost one-for-one in response to a very persistent income shock.

Not only is it reassuring that we confirm the second central prediction of the permanent income hypothesis, we also show that heterogeneous responses to persistent shocks can help us understand the mechanisms driving the failure of the first prediction. In particular, when comparing across households with different liquid assets, we provide strong evidence that liquidity constrained households have larger consumption responses. This stands in contrast to the mixed evidence that the literature has found when using transitory shocks for identification (Kueng, 2018). Our shock also allows us to quasi-experimentally identify a new dimension of heterogeneity — variation in the persistence of the shock length — and we show that consumption responds most when the shock is most persistent. While this provides qualitative support for the predictions of standard consumption-savings models, we highlight challenges in its quantitative fit.

Our persistent shock to disposable income comes from the divergence in the two main types of adjustable rate mortgages in Ireland in 2010. In the early 2000s, Irish banks offered two adjustable interest rate mortgage contracts: the so-called standard *variable* rate was set at the discretion of the banks but the competitive environment meant that it typically reflected the cost of funding for banks. The other product was contractually indexed to the ECB rate plus a fixed spread, and due to this tracking of the ECB rate it was called a *tracker* mortgage. Figure 1 shows that these interest rates closely followed each other until the Financial Crisis, after which they diverged when the cost of funding for Irish banks increased during the European sovereign debt crisis. This resulted in a positive shock to the disposable income of tracker rate borrowers relative to variable rate borrowers. The shock lasted for over ten years, with a spread of at least 2 percentage points remaining until the ECB started raising rates in mid-2022.

We estimate the propensity to save using linked bank account and mortgage data.




Figure 1: Divergence of the *Tracker* and *Variable* mortgage interest rates

Notes: This figure plots the mean interest rate of Tracker and Variable rate mortgages in our data. The Tracker rate is contracted to follow the ECB's rate plus a fixed spread. The Variable rate is the so-called Standard Variable Rate that banks offer to customers. It is not indexed to any specific rate and typically follows the funding costs of banks. *Source:* Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

To be comparable to the literature on consumption responses we discuss our results in terms of consumption responses, which have been converted from savings responses using the identity $MPC = 1 - MPS$.¹

Our first empirical finding is that the MPC is very high on average; households consume 91 percent of the income received. While this is much higher than the typical estimate in the literature on transitory shocks, it is qualitatively consistent with the view consumption should move almost one-for-one with highly persistent shocks. To quantitatively evaluate this intuition, we compare our estimate to the consumption response of a standard incomplete markets consumption-savings model in which infinitely lived consumers are subject to incomes shocks and a borrowing constraint. The average household in the data had a mortgage with 17 years (68 quarters) of remaining maturity when the shock occurred. We thus feed a 68 quarter income shock into our model and

¹Since we do not observe the components of consumption, we do not distinguish between consumption and expenditures, where the difference arises from durables (Laibson, Maxted and Moll, 2022). In the language of Laibson, Maxted and Moll (2022), our consumption responses are the marginal propensity to spend (MPX).

show that we can exactly match the average response, an MPC of 91 percent. At least for the average response to a persistent shock, we conclude that the standard model performs well.

As is tradition in the literature since Zeldes (1989), we evaluate the importance of liquidity constraints by testing whether households with low liquid assets have higher MPCs than those with high liquid assets. We find that this is the case; the MPC for households in the lowest liquid asset quartile is 100 percent and it is monotonically decreasing to 82 percent for households in the highest liquid asset quartile. The quantitative model predicts a similar consumption response, with an MPC of 102 percent for the lowest quartile and of 72 percent for the highest quartile. Again, that the model and data responses are within 10 percentage points suggests that the standard model with liquidity constraints fits the data well in response to persistent shocks. The empirical variation across the liquid asset distribution is of similar magnitude to the estimates for transitory shocks: we estimate a spread across liquid asset quartiles of 18 percentage points, while Fagereng, Holm and Natvik (2021) estimate a 16 percentage point spread in response to transitory shocks. We consider this to be new evidence that liquidity constraints can generate large, heterogeneous consumption responses even for persistent shocks.

An advantage of our persistent shock is that it is also large. By 2014 Q1, the median tracker household had lower payments that cumulatively exceeded €12,000 (the median income at origination is €66,000). The size of our shock may explain why we find strong evidence in favor of liquidity constraints, while the prior literature has found mixed results in response to tax rebates (Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2001; Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland, 2013). Kueng (2018) suggests that the excess sensitivity of non-liquidity constrained households may be explained by the fact that welfare losses from sub-optimal behavior are small when the income shock is also small. In the case of our larger, persistent shock, the welfare losses from mis-optimizing are larger, and this may rationalize why we do not estimate excess sensitivity for non-liquidity constrained households.

The nature of our shock also allows us to estimate the consumption response to shocks of different lengths or degrees of persistence. To date the literature has mostly identified unexpected persistent shocks using statistical models and covariance restrictions (Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008) and in the cases that persistent shocks have been quasi-experimentally identified (Di Maggio, Kermani,

Keys, Piskorski, Ramcharan, Seru and Yao, 2017), there has not been variation in the persistence of these shocks. In our case, we can identify variation in the persistence in the shock because, at the time of the shock, some households had mortgages with up to 20 years of remaining maturity, while others had mortgages with less than five years of remaining maturity. We find that the MPC is increasing in the length of the shock, from 61 percent for households with up to five years remaining mortgage maturity to 84 percent for those with six to ten years remaining, and 93 percent for those with over ten years remaining. The model similarly predicts that more persistent shocks have larger consumption responses, with MPCs of 27 percent, 53 percent and 100 percent respectively. However, the model’s MPCs differ from the empirical estimates, especially for the least persistent shocks where difference is as large as 34 percentage points. This is consistent with the prior literature in which the standard model’s MPCs are an order of magnitude lower than the empirical MPCs for transitory shocks (Kaplan and Violante, 2022).

We undertake a number of tests to ensure that our results are robust and not affected by selection. Before discussing these tests, it is worth noting that an inherent advantage of our shock is that it occurs in a population of interest, adjustable rate mortgage holders, that is representative of over 80 percent of the Irish mortgage market. This compares favorably to adjustable rate mortgages in the US, which represent between 16-38 percent of the mortgage market (Di Maggio, Kermani, Keys, Piskorski, Ramcharan, Seru and Yao, 2017). That being said, there remains a reasonable concern that despite being highly substitutable products, there may have been systematic selection into either the tracker or variable product. Indeed, while we find some evidence that the tracker and variable rate groups differ on observables, we find that controlling for these observable characteristics does not change our results. We flexibly control for income, age, mortgage size, location, year of origination and mortgage size, and allow the effect of each control to vary over time. In our preferred specification, the average MPC is exactly the same, 91.4 percent, with and without controls, and the inclusion of controls alters the coefficient by no more than 1 percentage point across our four specifications.

To rule out selection on unobserved heterogeneity we follow Byrne, Kelly and O’Toole (2021) and use an ancillary survey of Irish mortgage holders conducted by the Central Bank of Ireland in 2012 and 2013. This is the period after the interest rate shock occurred and during the highest levels of unemployment in Ireland following the financial crisis. We show that at this time, there is no difference in the probability of being unemployed or in the income change experienced by tracker and variable

rate mortgage holders. It is reassuring that, at least for these important predictors of consumption changes, there is no evidence of selection on unobserved heterogeneity.

Lastly, we confirm that savings held in bank checking and savings accounts are representative of the total financial assets of Irish households. Using the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey, we show that bank deposits represent 78 percent of financial assets for Irish mortgage holders. Furthermore, this share is stable across the liquid asset distribution. This suggests that unobservable savings are modest on average and are unlikely to bias our estimates of MPC heterogeneity.

Contribution to the literature. There is an extensive literature estimating the response of consumption to income shocks. As noted by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010, 2017) in their surveys, the marginal propensity to consume is not a structural parameter and therefore likely depends on the nature of the shock. In particular, theory suggests that the consumption response will depend on, among other factors, whether the income change is transitory or persistent, and in each case whether it was unexpected or not. Our paper’s main contribution is to provide estimates of the response of consumption to an income shock that is both *unexpected and persistent*. Such shocks, despite their prevalence in the world, have received much less attention than unexpected transitory shocks or expected persistent shocks, likely in part because they are more difficult to identify in quasi-experimental settings². We also emphasize the importance of heterogeneity in the response to persistent shocks, and heterogeneity in the persistence of the shock is especially novel.

The literature on the response to *transitory* shocks has leveraged expected changes such as tax rebates (Parker, 1999; Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003; Johnson, Parker and Souleles, 2001) and unexpected changes such as dividends (Bodkin, 1959; Agarwal and Qian, 2014), lottery wins (Fagereng, Holm and Natvik, 2021; Golosov, Graber, Mogstad and Novgorodsky, 2023), unemployment (Gruber, 1997; Browning and Crossley, 2001; Ganong and Noel, 2019) and firm-wide income changes (Ganong, Jones, Noel, Farrell, Greig and Wheat, 2023).³ This literature has frequently shown that empirical MPCs

²While our discussion focuses on quasi-experimental identification of shocks, there is also a rich literature using covariance restrictions (Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008) and subjective expectations (Hayashi, 1985; Pistaferri, 2001) to estimate consumption responses to both transitory and persistent income shocks. Similarly, while our focus is on unexpected persistent shocks, our paper relates to those studying income changes that were expected in advance, such as at retirement (Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg, 2001; Aguiar and Hurst, 2005, 2007).

³Pilosoph, Lewis and Melcangi (2022) estimate latent heterogeneity in the MPC using the tax rebates studies by Johnson et al. (2001) and Parker et al. (2013).

are much higher than MPCs from a one asset consumption-savings model. This has motivated the extension of the standard model to include illiquid assets (Kaplan and Violante, 2014) or behavioural preferences (Laibson, 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001), which can better match the empirical MPCs in response to transitory shocks.

In the literature on unexpected persistent shocks, Di Maggio, Kermani, Keys, Piskorski, Ramcharan, Seru and Yao (2017) and Druedahl, Jensen and Leth-Petersen (2021) also use variation in the interest rate on adjustable rate mortgages to estimate the consumption response changing mortgage payments.⁴ Di Maggio et al. (2017) use data on car purchases and find that a reduction in monthly mortgage payments of 100 dollars results in a monthly increase in consumption on cars of 12 dollars⁵. Druedahl, Jensen and Leth-Petersen (2021) focus the high frequency response of consumption to an interest rate change, with a particular focus on the announcement effect of changes that revealed to households six months in advance. They show that households with many liquid assets respond upon announcement of the income shock whereas households with low liquid assets do not respond until the income shock is realized. They also estimate that 41 percent of the income is consumed over the ten months following the announcement of an interest rate change. Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (2001) research design is most similar to ours, in the sense that they compare a treated group (of lottery winners) to a group an untreated group (of lottery players who did not win). In their setting, the lottery income shock is persistent because winners receive their prize spread in annual payments over twenty years. They find that individuals had saved about 16 percent of the additional income at the time that about half their prize was received.

Relative to the prior literature, we offer the first estimates of MPC heterogeneity for persistent shocks, in particular how it varies with household heterogeneity in liquid assets and in the persistence of the shocks themselves. These are valuable dimensions of heterogeneity for evaluating the performance of consumption-savings models. While our average estimates align with the high MPCs previously identified using lotteries

⁴Baker (2018) identifies persistent income shocks using firm shocks as instruments. He finds an elasticity of consumption to income of 0.4. This lower elasticity may be reflective of the fact that his income shocks, while persistent, are mean reverting by around 40 percent after six quarters. Beyond our focus on consumption, there is also a recent literature studying the impact of persistent shocks on labor supply Zator (2022), debt reduction Cookson, Gilje and Heimer (2022), and business formation Cookson, Bellon, Gilje and Heimer (2021).

⁵While they only observe a component of consumption (car purchases), they use a back-of-the-envelope calculation to extrapolate to a total MPC of 0.8.

(Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote, 2001), our findings introduce new evidence that such large MPCs can emerge from interest rate fluctuations.

Our approach offers enhanced identification of consumption responses to interest rate adjustments. While previous studies relied on variations within households over time (Di Maggio et al., 2017) or across households with varying treatments (Druehl, Jensen and Leth-Petersen, 2021), our quasi-experimental method delineates a distinct treatment and control group. This clarity allows for a more precise estimation of the marginal propensity to consume. As Kaplan and Violante (2014) emphasize, consumption responses identified without a consistently untreated group (as seen in studies of expected tax rebates) might deviate from the MPC predicted by models, especially if households respond in anticipation of the changes. It’s also worth noting that responses to fluctuating interest rates blend income and substitution effects. In contrast, our approach isolates the income effect because household could no longer borrow at the tracker mortgage rate.

We also contribute to a literature that employs causally identified consumption responses to discipline models of consumption (Kaplan and Violante, 2014, 2022) and models of the aggregate economy’s response to fiscal and monetary policy (Kaplan, Moll and Violante, 2018; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018; Auclert, Rognlie and Straub, 2023; Wolf, 2023). Our contribution is to highlight that, at least in the case of very persistent shocks, the standard incomplete markets model of consumption and savings aligns well with empirical estimates. Our heterogeneous MPCs suggest that liquidity matters even for a sample of households that have lots of illiquid assets. This provides evidence in favor of models that generate higher MPCs through liquidity constraints, including models with illiquid assets.

We also relate to a work on mortgage design and the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission (Campbell and Cocco, 2015; Amromin, Bhutta and Keys, 2020; Campbell, Clara and Cocco, 2021; Guren, Krishnamurthy and McQuade, 2021). Our findings indicate that the pass-through of adjustable interest rate changes to consumption is substantially greater than for fixed-rate mortgages (where the disposable income channel is dampened by non-refinancing). This implies that the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission is likely more potent in adjustable rate mortgage markets.

Lastly, we contribute to a growing literature using Irish microdata to study a variety of mortgages and household finance topics (Byrne, Kelly and O’Toole, 2021; O’Malley, 2021; Higgins, 2024; Acharya, Bergant, Crosignani, Eisert and McCann, 2022; Palmer,

Byrne, Devine, King and McCarthy, 2022). Ireland is an especially interesting setting considering that it had one of the most severe economic and banking crises in response to the global finance crisis (e.g. see Lane (2012) and Honohan (2019)). Among this literature, we most directly relate to Byrne, Kelly and O’Toole (2021), who use the same interest rate shock to identify the impact of changes in mortgage payments on mortgage default.

Roadmap. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides background on the Irish mortgage market and the specific conditions that led to our shock. Section 2 describes the data used. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 compares the empirical results to those in a consumption-savings model and Section 6 concludes.

1 Background and Irish Institutional Context


In this section we describe the origin of the shock, as well as providing some related background on the relevant features of the Irish mortgage market.

In the early 2000’s, Irish banks offered a short-term fixed mortgage product (typically fixed for up to five years) and two adjustable rate mortgage products, the variable rate and the tracker rate. As figure 2a illustrates, the majority of mortgages issued at this time were one of these two adjustable rate mortgages (Kelly, Lyons and O’Toole, 2015). The interest rate on the variable product is set at the discretion of the banks, yet competition between banks meant that it is closely related to the funding costs of banks. Thus, changes in the ECB’s main refinancing rate are typically passed on to consumers. The tracker rate on the other hand is contractually indexed to the ECB’s main refinancing rate plus a fixed spread that is typically less than 100 basis points. The tracker rate was a relatively new product, having been introduced by one of the banks in 2001 and the remaining banks followed suit shortly thereafter (Byrne, Kelly and O’Toole, 2021).

In the years while both the tracker and variable products were offered to new customers, their interest rates closely tracked each other. However, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the funding costs of Irish banks increased substantially while the ECB’s rate fell. This resulted in a divergence between the variable and tracker rates, as shown in Figure 1. The tracker rate product was no longer profitable at the offered margins and, as shown in Figure 2a, banks stopped issuing new tracker mortgages after 2008. Figure 2b shows that as the banks’ cost of deposit funding rose relative to the

Figure 2: Variable and Tracker mortgages rates and issuance over time

(a) Share of new mortgages issued by type (b) Change in spread since Jan 2003 (%)



Note: Left plot shows the share of new mortgages issued by interest rate contract type. Source: Mortgage Data, Central Bank of Ireland. Right plot shows the change in two spreads, (i) deposit rate minus ECB rate and (ii) standard variable rate minus ECB rate. To focus on the change over time, we normalize both spreads to zero in January 2013 Source: Central Bank of Ireland, Retail Interest Rates Statistics (Tables B.1.1. and B.1.2).

ECB rate, the spread between the variable rate and the ECB rate increased by a similar magnitude. Between 2007 and 2012, both spreads increased by about 2 percentage points. To the extent that bond or interbank funding was still available to Irish banks at this time, the cost of these funds also increased substantially. Lane (2015) reports that spreads on Irish banks' credit default swaps increased from approximately 0 percentage points in 2007 to between 2 and 6 percentage points in 2009 and 2010.

We model the shock as both unexpected and persistent. We consider the fact that banks stopped offering the tracker mortgage to be evidence that the divergence in the interest rates was unexpected, even by these sophisticated players in the market. As for the persistence of the shock, a spread of over 2 percentage points remained between the tracker and variable rates for more than ten years.⁶ Of course, the fact that the shock turned out to be persistent ex-post, this does not mean that it was known to be persistent when it first occurred. That said, at the time of the shock, the ECB was using forward guidance to communicate that its rate would remain low for an extended period of time. Financial markets didn't seem to think that the high cost of funding for Irish banks would be temporary, leading to the Irish government providing a bailout for the Irish banks, which ultimately led to a bailout of the Irish government itself in the years following (Honohan, 2019). Combined, it seems reasonable that households

⁶The spread remained until mid-2022 when the ECB increased its benchmark rate in response to rising inflation.

would have expected the divergence in rates to be persistent if not permanent.

While the tracker and variable rate products were close substitutes, one might still be concerned that there is unobservable selection into either rate type, which could occur either because of screening by banks or self-selection by households. In terms of screening by banks, there are some features of the Irish market that mitigate the risk that screening is a source of selection. In general, Irish banks do not tailor mortgage terms or price discriminate based on individual risk. For instance, 94 percent of households with a variable rate in 2014 Q1 had the exact same rate of 4.58 percent.⁷ Based on reports at the time, banks sometimes restricted access to tracker mortgages based on certain mortgage characteristics, though importantly these are characteristics that we observe in our data and control for, such as the size of the loan. For example, the Irish Times (2004) reported that some banks only offered tracker rates to loans over €150,000 or €250,000.⁸ Other than these observable mortgage characteristics, the Irish Times (2003) reported that tracker mortgages were accessible to all customers, “At most lenders it is possible for standard variable-rate customers to switch to their ECB tracker mortgage. “It’s a case of writing in and asking for it,” says Mr Ferguson [of mortgage brokers Ferguson and Associates].”

In terms of self-selection by households, there are a number of reasons to think that households considered these products to be close substitutes (and in the next section we provide empirical evidence against self-selection). Since both contracts are adjustable rate mortgages, they are clearly closer substitutes than fixed rate mortgages. This mitigates risks associated with comparing adjustable and fixed rate consumers, who may differ in their risk aversion, or in their expectations of or exposure to future interest rates. Discussions in newspapers at the time described trackers as “a good alternative to the standard variable rate” (Irish Times, 2003). These reports also noted that some banks offered lower interest on variable rates while other banks did so on tracker rates, which implies that neither product type was clearly dominated by the other.⁹ And even if either product was slightly cheaper, there is wider evidence that

⁷Banks even refer to the variable rate product as their “Standard Variable Rate”, implying that it is offered as standard to most customers.

⁸Irish Times (2004) reported “First Active’s tracker mortgage offers several different rates depending on the value of the loan in relation to the property price, known as the loan-to-value ratio (LTV)... But in all cases, customers will only qualify for the tracker rate if they borrow €250,000 or more.” “Meanwhile, Permanent TSB has two rates according to the size of the loan: the more you borrow, the less interest you will be charged, but the lowest amount on which it will advance a tracker mortgage rate is €150,000. ”

⁹“three of the six tracker mortgage providers currently have more competitive rates on these mort-

households rarely choose the minimum cost mortgage product (Robles-Garcia, 2020; Benetton, 2021), which means that it is likely that comparable customers chose both contracts for reasons other than the structure of the contract. All that being said, it is natural to be concerned that there is selection into tracker status based on unobservable characteristics, such as financial sophistication. With this in mind, in the next section we use ancillary survey data to test whether tracker holders were better educated or more exposed to income shocks, and find little evidence that they are.

2 Data

This section describes the datasets used, compares the characteristics of tracker and variable rate borrowers, and outlines the construction of our shock variable.

2.1 Data description

We use data held by the Central Bank of Ireland. We create a household level dataset by merging a loan-level mortgage dataset (the “Mortgage Data”) with a dataset of checking and savings bank accounts (the “Bank Account Data”). The data were collected by regulators for separate purposes and were not intended to be linked. We therefore only have unique customer identifiers for one Irish bank. Our final sample has 10351 households and Table 1 summarizes the main variables of this linked dataset (the “Merged Mortgage-Bank Dataset”).

Mortgage data. At origination, we observe information about the loan, including the origination balance, house price and the originating LTV, and about the borrower, including their income, age and post code. We also observe quarterly updates about the mortgage, including the current interest rate type, interest rate, outstanding balance, and days past due.

Bank account data. For each account, we observe the quarterly average account balance (computed daily over the past quarter), the account balance on the final day of each half year, and interest accrued.¹⁰ We observe whether the account was a checking

gages than they do on their standard variable rate, while a further two offer better deals if LTV ratios are below 60 per cent... “The ICS tracker is not particularly competitive,” says Ms Wellband. “It’s the same as the standard variable rate. I don’t see why they didn’t shade it a little bit.” (Irish Times, 2003).

¹⁰Every six months, banks reported the average account balance over the past 3 months and past 6 months. We compute the average balance for the missing quarter using Average Balance in Quarter_{*t*-1} = 2 × Average Balance in Half-Year_{*t*} – Average Balance in Quarter_{*t*}.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

| | Mean | P25 | P50 | P75 |
|--|---------|-------|--------|--------|
| Household information (at 2012Q4) | | | | |
| Borrower Age | 46 | 39 | 45 | 51 |
| Number of Household Members | 1.83 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Dublin (%) | 49 | | | |
| Bank account information (at 2012Q4) | | | | |
| No of Deposit Accounts | 1.76 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Quarterly Average Account Balance | 8581 | 779 | 2776 | 10156 |
| Mortgage account information (at 2012Q4) | | | | |
| No of Liens | 1.72 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Outstanding Balance | 149956 | 61974 | 127036 | 213287 |
| Current Interest Rate (%) | 4.19 | 4.68 | 4.68 | 4.68 |
| Current Loan-to-Value | 0.78 | 0.32 | 0.68 | 1.12 |
| Quarterly Mortgage Payments | 3214 | 1908 | 2813 | 4025 |
| Tracker Rate (%) | 20 | | | |
| SVR Rate (%) | 80 | | | |
| Quarters to Maturity | 59 | 31 | 58 | 86 |
| Primary Dwelling Home (%) | 83 | | | |
| Mortgage account information (at origination) | | | | |
| Borrower Age at Origination | 37.14 | 30 | 35 | 43 |
| Year of Origination | 2002.69 | 2000 | 2003 | 2006 |
| Income at Origination | 73794 | 48000 | 65743 | 90964 |
| Loan-to-Value at Origination | 0.58 | 0.38 | 0.6 | 0.81 |

Note: Table presents the summary statistics for our main sample of 10351 households. We group the variables into four categories: households level information; bank account information that is observable quarterly; mortgage account information that is observable quarterly; and mortgage account information that is only observable at origination. For information that varies over time, we summarize the data at a single snapshot (2012 Q4). P25, P50 and P75 are the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles respectively. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

or savings account, and current information about the account holder (age, post code).¹¹

Unit of observation. We construct our data at the household level. We observe the unique customer identifier for each account holder, which we use to merge the mortgage and bank account data. We classify households as any unique customers who hold a

¹¹Irish banks call the checking account a *transactional* account and the savings account a *deposit* account.

bank or mortgage account together. Once we identify households, we merge every bank account and mortgage held by every customer in the household, including single and joint accounts. For example, if we see two customers with a joint mortgage, then this household would include all of these customer’s bank accounts and mortgages.

Timing. The mortgage data was first collected in 2012 Q1 and has been updated quarterly ever since. The first collection included information at origination which we use to reconstruct the data back to each mortgage’s origination date. We are missing mortgages that were originated and repaid or refinanced before 2012. The bank account data was collected on an ad-hoc basis regulators between 2011 Q3 and 2014 Q4. Therefore, our regressions are limited to this period.

Sample restrictions. We do our best to restrict the sample to households who are using actively using their bank accounts. We do this by excluding: (i) households who have exactly zero balance across all bank accounts; and (ii) households whose bank balances (on all bank accounts) are exactly the same in two consecutive two quarters. We make four further restrictions. First, we restrict to households with at least one mortgage issued between 2000 and 2008, which excludes years when tracker mortgages were not issued. Second, we restrict to mortgage holders with at least one tracker or variable rate mortgage, and exclude those with only a fixed rate mortgage. Third, we exclude households who defaulted on their mortgage before or during our sample period, because our disposable income shock does not apply to households who are not paying their mortgage. Fourth, we drop households in the top percentile of balances and changes in balances, corresponding to balances greater than €152k and quarterly changes in excess of 200 log points.¹² To ensure that our sample is consistent across specifications, we also exclude a small number of households for whom we do not observe a full set of controls.

2.2 Sample Balance and Selection

To evaluate the balance between the tracker and variable rate groups, Table 2 compares summary statistics for both groups. We restrict the comparison to a reasonably short window—in 2006 and 2007—to avoid changes driven by large increase in house prices and mortgage balances over the entire sample period. The groups are comparable in terms of location (as measured by the percentage in the capital city Dublin) and age, which is statistically significantly different but not economically so at less than one year.

¹²In robustness, we show that our results are robust the inclusion of these groups.

Table 2: Summary Statistics By Interest Rate Type


| | Variable (N=2952) | | Tracker (N=1096) | | Difference | p-value |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|------------|---------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | | |
| Age | 37.5 | 9.97 | 36.7 | 9.56 | -0.83 | 0.02 |
| Dublin (%) | 48 | 49.98 | 47.35 | 49 | -0.95 | 0.59 |
| Mortgage Balance | 117 | 107.30 | 218 | 154.05 | 101.46 | 0.00 |
| Annual Gross income | 82 | 373.82 | 977 | 62.75 | 14.30 | 0.05 |
| Interest Rate (%) | 4.6 | 0.56 | 4.5 | 0.56 | -0.14 | 0.00 |
| Quarterly Mortgage Payment | 1987 | 1712.84 | 3474 | 2370.69 | 1486.58 | 0.00 |
| Loan-to-Value Ratio (%) | 51 | 26.90 | 64 | 23.51 | 12.42 | 0.00 |
| House Price | 277 | 410 | 400.48 | 314.78 | 122.90 | 0.00 |

Notes: Table presents comparison of borrower and loan characteristics of variable and tracker groups. Given that contract types may differ across liens, we restrict attention to first lien. We also restrict attention to loans issues between 2006 and 2007, to avoid differences in incomes and house prices driven by variation over time. Mortgage balance, income and house price are shown in 1000s of EUR. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

Tracker mortgage holders earn about 18 percent more. They also bought more expensive houses, and had correspondingly larger initial balances and payments. Despite these average differences, Figure 3 plots the distributions of income, age, mortgage balance and interest rate for both groups and shows that there is considerable overlap across these distributions. This means that we are able to find comparable households in both groups. Given these differences in observables, our identifying assumption will rely on exogeneity *conditional* on observable controls, and we will include a rich set of controls to ensure that we are comparing within groups of similar households.

Though we can use controls to compare tracker and variable rate borrowers with similar observable characteristics, it is reasonable to be concerned that these households differ on unobservable variables that will also influence the savings and consumption behavior of these groups. In the case of mortgages, a natural concern is that financially sophisticated borrowers are self-selecting into either product or that banks are screening based on repayment risk. Fortunately we can test both of these hypotheses using an ad-hoc survey of mortgage borrowers undertaken by the Central Bank of Ireland, which we merge the survey to our mortgage data. The survey took place between May 2012 and February 2013, around the peak of unemployment in Ireland following the financial crisis. The survey asked respondents about their income and employment status at the

Figure 3: Distribution of Variable and Tracker Mortgage Borrowers



Note: Figures show kernel densities for income, age, mortgage balance and interest rates at origination, split by tracker and variable rate group. The sample includes all mortgages for new house purchases originated in 2006 and 2007. For presentation purposes, the plots are truncated to include only ages up to 60, incomes up to €500,000 and mortgage balances up to €1m. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

time of the survey, allowing us to test whether either group experienced bigger incomes changes or more unemployment.¹³

Table 3 reports the results of regressions of (i) the log income change and (ii) unemployment status on the interest rate group and a number of controls. The income change is measured between each household's origination date and the survey date. Columns 3 and 6 show that there is no difference between the two groups conditional

¹³The survey has been used by numerous studies at the Central Bank of Ireland. See McCarthy and McQuinn (2013), McCarthy (2014), and Byrne, Kelly and O'Toole (2021) for more information.

on controls: both estimates are economically close to zero and statistically insignificant. While column 1 shows that tracker households experience larger income shocks, this is not statistically significant after the inclusion of origin year fixed effects. Since most tracker mortgages were issued later in the boom, this suggests that households later cohorts of borrowers were more likely to receive negative income shocks, but, reassuringly for our purposes, these differences do not differ across the two groups conditional on origin year. Table A1 sequentially adds the controls and reports that adding origin year and income are the biggest contributors to reduction in the coefficient.

Table 3: Survey of Mortgage Holders After Interest Rate Shock

| | Income Change | | | Unemployed | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Tracker | -0.254*** (0.0683) | -0.129 (0.0774) | 0.029 (0.0611) | -0.029 (0.0215) | 0.001 (0.0244) | 0.005 (0.0256) |
| Observations | 616 | 616 | 593 | 626 | 626 | 593 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.020 | 0.044 | 0.464 | 0.001 | 0.026 | 0.006 |
| Origin year and bank FE | | Yes | Yes | | Yes | Yes |
| Controls | | | Yes | | | Yes |

Note: This table uses a survey of mortgage holders that is linked to our mortgage data. Columns 1-3 test whether tracker mortgage holders were more likely to experience changes in income between mortgage origination and the survey date. Columns 4-6 test whether tracker mortgage holders were more likely to be unemployed at the time of the survey. Controls include age, income at origination, LTV, and whether the household was a first-time buyer. Source: Survey of Mortgage Holders 2012-13 and Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

Table A2 tests whether education status predicts the interest rate group, which is a test of whether financially sophisticated households self-selected into the tracker group. Unconditionally, tertiary education positively predicts tracker group status, however the sign is reversed when including controls. Indeed, both results are statistically insignificant and thus suggest that education is not an important predictor. Taken together, the survey provides reassuring evidence that the tracker group is not selected on unobservable financial literacy or income risk.

2.3 Household Balance Sheets

In this section we evaluate the share of assets that are captured by our measure of checking and savings account balances, because one might be concerned that we are missing savings held in other accounts. To do so, we use the ECB’s Household Finance

and Consumption Survey, a representative survey of household balance sheets in the euro area. We use the second wave that was undertaken in Ireland between March 2013 - September 2013 and aligns with the period in which we observe our bank account data.¹⁴ We focus on two measures of household assets: real assets, which includes housing, business assets, vehicles and valuables; and financial assets, which includes non-self employment private business, sight accounts, savings accounts, mutual funds, bonds, shares, managed accounts, voluntary pension plans. Together these sum to total assets (excluding public and occupational pension plans).

Table 4 shows that bank deposits make up 78 percent of financial assets for the sample of households who own a home with a mortgage. This reassuringly suggests that our measure of savings is capturing the vast majority of financial assets, and therefore we are not missing a large fraction of savings. Households may also save in real assets and for completeness table 4 reports that deposits represent a small fraction of real assets. This leaves open the possibility that missing savings may occur in real assets, such as second homes purchases. That said, since real assets are mostly illiquid, it is likely that such savings would show up in financial assets before they are invested in illiquid assets.

Table 4: Deposits as a Share of Assets

| | Deposits | Share of Financial | Share of Real |
|-----------------------|----------|--------------------|---------------|
| Housing Tenure Status | | | |
| Own - outright | 35188 | 84 | 12 |
| Own - w/mortgage | 13222 | 78 | 5 |
| Rent/other | 7884 | 90 | 184 |
| Total | 19691 | 83 | 54 |

Note: Table reports mean deposits, and deposits as a share financial and real assets. Deposits are included in financial assets and not real assets. The sample includes 5,419 observations and estimates are weighted using survey weights. Source: Household Finance and Consumption Survey, European Central Bank.

2.4 Construction of the shock

The divergence in interest rates resulted in tracker rate mortgage holders paying lower amounts compared to variable rate mortgage holders with the same mortgage terms. We therefore construct our shock so that it can be interpreted as a positive shock to

¹⁴While this is the second wave of the survey, it is the first wave conducted in Ireland.

disposable income for the tracker mortgage group. In the robustness section we will show that our results are not sensitive to constructing an analogous disposable income shock that is negative for the variable rate group.

We observe the actual payments of tracker households. To compute their counterfactual payment, we need to know what interest rate they would have had, if they were in the variable rate group. We use the average interest rate of the variable rate group as the counterfactual interest rate for the tracker borrower. The average interest rate, as opposed to an individual specific risk-adjusted interest rate, is a very good approximation of the counterfactual interest rate because there is almost no variation in interest rates within the variable rate group. For example, in 2014 Q1 94 percent of these households had the same rate of 4.58 percent. With this counterfactual interest rate, we compute the counterfactual payment using the annuity formula

$$\text{payment}_t = \text{balance}_t \times r \times \frac{(1+r)^{n(t)}}{(1+r)^{n(t)} - 1}, \quad (1)$$

where t is the current quarter, r is the *quarterly* interest rate and n is the number of quarters to maturity¹⁵.

In our analysis, it is important to consistently compare stocks and flows of savings. Bank account balances measure the stock of savings while changes in bank account balances measure the flow of savings. Since our shock occurs over multiple periods, we also define its flow and stock components.

The payment savings in a given quarter t —flow payment savings— are the difference between the counterfactual (variable rate) payment and the actual (tracker rate) payment

$$\begin{aligned} m_t^{flow} \equiv \text{payment savings shock}_t &= \text{payment}_t^{\text{variable}} - \text{payment}_t^{\text{tracker}} && \text{if tracker} \\ &= 0 && \text{if variable.} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The stock of payment savings at time t is the cumulative payment savings received up

¹⁵Irish banks typically adjust the interest rate monthly. However, since our data is quarterly, we compute the payments at a quarterly frequency. There will however be some small approximation error arising from interest rates changes that occur in months that are not at the quarter end.

to time t since the mortgage originated

$$m_t^{stock} = \sum_{j=0}^t m_j^{flow}, \quad (3)$$

where $j = 0$ is the origination date of the mortgage¹⁶. The change in the stock over one quarter is equal to the flow $\Delta m_{t+1,t}^{stock} = m_{t+1}^{flow}$. We estimate the savings response over longer horizons, thus it is useful to note that the change in the stock, $\Delta m_{t+k,t}^{stock} = \sum_{j=0}^{t+k} m_{t+k}^{flow} - \sum_{j=0}^t m_j^{flow}$, is equal to the sum of the flows between these dates

$$\Delta m_{t+k,t}^{stock} = \sum_{j=t+1}^{t+k} m_j^{flow}. \quad (4)$$

We calculate the payment savings for each lien held by the household and use the total payment savings for the household. This accounts for borrowers who have different interest rates on separate liens.


Figure 4 plots the size of the payment shock by year. The flow payment savings, m_t^{flow} (panel a) were very close to zero in the years leading up to 2010, after which a large difference opens up. In 2011, the interquartile range of this differences is €361-908 per quarter. In line with interpreting this as a positive disposable income shock for the tracker mortgage holders, the payment savings are positive.

Panel b plots the stock of payment savings in each year. Given that the flow payment savings are approximately flat after 2011, the stock of savings increases linearly in the years following. By 2014 Q1, the median tracker household saved €12,206. To give a sense of how large these savings are, it is worth noting that the cumulative size of the shock by this point is larger than the mean bank balance —€8,581— reported in Table 1.

Panel c plots the flow payment savings as a percentage of the household's income at origination. For the median household, the payment savings in 2014 was equivalent to about 4 percent of their income. Panel d plots the flow payment savings as a percentage of the household's counterfactual mortgage payment. From 2010 onwards, the majority of tracker households saved at least 10 percent relative to their counterfactual

¹⁶While we ignore the accumulation of interest in this definition. Since interest will affect both bank balances and payment savings in the similar manner, the impact on propensities to save/consume is minimal. We account for interest when converting propensities to save at different horizons.

Figure 4: Box Plot of the Size of Payment Savings



Note: Figure shows the distribution of our payment savings shock over time via box plots. For each year the box reports the median, 25th and 75th percentile, and whiskers show the upper and lower adjacent values. Panel (a) reports the flow payment savings, Panel (b) reports the stock of payment savings, and Panel (c) reports the flow payment savings as a percentage of income (as measured at origination). Panel (d) reports the flow payment savings as a percentage of the counterfactual mortgage payment on the first lien. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

payment and, in 2014, the median tracker household saved 23 percent.

3 Empirical strategy

To estimate the savings response to a change in mortgage payments, we estimate the following equation

$$\Delta b_{i,t+j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta m_{i,t+j}^{stock} + \sum_t \gamma_t (X_i \times \tau_t) + u_{i,t}, \quad (5)$$

where $\Delta b_{i,t+j}$ is the change in bank balance of household i in between quarter t and $t+j$, $\Delta m_{i,t+j}^{stock}$ is the change in the stock of payment savings between quarter t and $t+j$, X_i is a vector of time-invariant characteristics of households i , and τ_t are quarter fixed effects that are interacted with the time-invariant characteristics.

We only include household characteristics that were known at the time of the shock and could otherwise affect changes in consumption, including geographic, lifecycle and leverage factors. Controlling for household characteristics that vary after the shock, such as income or total outstanding balance, would be, in the language of Angrist and Pischke (2009), “bad controls” because they may be directly affected by the shock. For instance the shock may induce households to work more or households may use the income to pay down their mortgage. The characteristics X_i include the age of the household at the time of the shock, the age the household when they took out the mortgage, the income of the household at origination, the postcode of the households primary residence (as measured by the collateral on the mortgage), the year of origination of the first lien and the total outstanding balance as at 2008Q4. To allow for non-linearities, we group continuous control into between five and tens bins, and estimate a separate effect for each bin. To allow for the effect of these fixed characteristics to vary over time, we interact them with quarter fixed effects τ_t , and the estimated coefficients are thus indexed by time, γ_t . For example, this allows for income shocks to have a different effect on savings for high and low income households, and for those affects to be different in 2010 than in 2014.

Since equation (5) is in differences, we are estimating the relationship between the *flow* of bank savings and *flow* of mortgage savings between t and $t+j$. The coefficient β_1 estimates the proportion of the payment savings that are saved in bank accounts, which is the marginal propensity to save. Our primary specification is in euros because this identifies the marginal propensity to save that is directly comparable to our model.

We also report results for all specifications in logs.¹⁷

Our identifying assumption is that the error term is uncorrelated with the payment difference conditional on our controls

$$E[\Delta m_{it}^{stock} \cdot u_{it} | X_{it}, \tau_t] = 0. \quad (6)$$

This is a stronger identifying assumption than unconditional exogeneity. If our shock was truly randomly distributed across borrowers we could rely on the weaker assumption that the error is unconditionally exogenous $E[\Delta m_{it}^{stock} \cdot u_{it}] = 0$, however Section 2 showed that there is some evidence of selection between the two borrower groups. Under this assumption, we estimate the causal impact of payment reductions on savings. Our results are stable to adding control variables which we interpret as evidence that selection is not a major concern.

Equation (5) is also general enough to estimate changes at different horizons. For $j = 1$ it encompasses the typical equation used in the literature to estimate one period MPCs from transitory income shocks (Fagereng, Holm and Natvik, 2021). For $j > 1$ it can also estimate longer differences, which may be important given that our shock is persistent. We also run this in regression in levels, in which case we include individual with fixed effects and estimate the following equation

$$b_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 m_{i,t}^{stock} + \sum_t \gamma_t (X_i \times \tau_t) + \alpha_i + u_{it}. \quad (7)$$

As noted by (Fagereng, Holm and Natvik, 2021), in the presence of heterogeneous responses our estimates are a weighted average of the marginal propensity to save. This is because OLS weights the coefficient on the regression by the square of the size of the shock, resulting in an estimate that is biased towards those who received the largest change in income. Since theory predicts that there will be heterogeneous responses, we investigate these by performing sub-sample analysis along the dimensions of suggested by the theory.

¹⁷To account for zeros, we define the log of variable x to be $\log(1 + x)$.

4 Empirical results

4.1 Average saving response

One period time horizon. Table 5 reports our main estimates of the propensity to save. The columns report estimates in levels (column 1), log levels (column 2), level differences (column 3) and log differences (column 4). Column 5-8 report estimates in the same order while including a rich set of controls. We prefer the specification in column 7, which corresponds to equation 5 with our full set of controls, because it is in euros and thus directly corresponds to a model implied MPC. This specification estimates that for every dollar of income households save 0.087 dollars or 8.7 percent. This implies an MPC of 91 percent. The estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level. Alternatively, we could test the hypothesis that the MPC is zero and that the MPS is one. The final row of the table tests this hypothesis with a t-test that $\beta = 1$ and reports that the probability is below 0.001 for all specifications.

Table 5: The Marginal Propensity to Save

| | (1) Savings | (2) Log Savings | (3) Δ Savings | (4) Δ Log Savings | (5) Savings | (6) Log Savings | (7) Δ Savings | (8) Δ Log Savings |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Payment Savings | 0.083*** (0.0210) | | | | 0.077*** (0.0242) | | | |
| Log Payment Savings | | 0.067*** (0.0241) | | | | 0.076** (0.0326) | | |
| D.Payment Savings | | | 0.086*** (0.0221) | | | | 0.086*** (0.0219) | |
| D.Log Payment Savings | | | | 0.056*** (0.0154) | | | | 0.059** (0.0217) |
| Observations | 144914 | 144914 | 134563 | 134563 | 144914 | 144914 | 134563 | 134563 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.902 | 0.907 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.903 | 0.907 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | | | Yes | Yes | | |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | | | | | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: This table reports estimates from regression equations 5 (differences) and 7 (levels). The dependent variable is a household's bank account balance ("Savings"), $b_{i,t}$. The independent variable is stock of payment savings $m_{i,t}^{stock}$. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 are level specifications. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 are difference specifications and the independent and dependent variables are first-differenced. Variable names indicate euro and log specifications. Controls are current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, deciles of total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by quarter in the differenced specifications, or double clustered by quarter and individual in the levels specifications. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The magnitude and statistical significance of the estimate is practically the same as the same specification without controls (0.086) shown in column 3. This suggests

that selection on observables does not meaningfully alter our estimate of the MPS. The estimate is also insensitive to the specific model chosen. The range of estimates from the levels and level differences specifications, in the odd numbered columns, imply an MPS in the range of 7.7 to 8.6 percent, and therefore an implied MPC in the range of 91-92 percent. The specifications using logs, in even numbered columns, imply a range for the elasticity of savings with respect to income of 5.6-7.6 percent. This range also implies a small savings response and large consumption response.

Multiple period time horizon. Table 6 examines savings response over multiple horizons. Recall that we first observe bank account savings on 2011Q3, which is over one year since the gap in payments opened up. The left most column shows the differences in savings at this date, and we estimate that the tracker group have saved 2 percent of the payment savings that they’ve received up to this point in time. This difference in savings is not statistically significant. That the gap is small at the first time we observe savings is reassuring as it suggests that the differences in savings by the end of the sample are not simply driven by differences in savings at the beginning of the sample.

The remaining columns report the share of payment savings that are saved between various horizons, Δm_{t+j}^{stock} . Each regressions starts at $t = 2011Q3$, the first quarter that we observe the savings data, and j is the number of quarters to the quarter listed in the column header. The final column reports the share of payment savings that households have saved by 2014Q4, which is thirteen quarters after we first observe savings balances. The estimates suggest that by the third quarter, there is a statistically significant difference in savings of 0.135. This implies that households have saved 14 percent of the payment savings that they have received up to this point in time. By the end of the sample, the difference in savings is 0.093, which implies that households have saved 9 percent of the payment savings that they have received up to this point in time.¹⁸ Overall the main takeaway is that, on average, households save a very small fraction of the payment savings received over this time period. Therefore the implied consumption response is large, between 86 and 91 percent.

At first glance, our shock might seem well-placed to estimate intertemporal MPCs (“iMPCs”) which Auclert, Rognlie and Straub (2023) show are important for disciplining the dynamics of consumption. However, once the gap in flow payments begins, there is little variation flows over time; they are highly auto-correlated. It is therefore

¹⁸It is worth noting that even though the propensity to save declines between the third and the final quarter, the total savings balance is still increasing. This is because both the denominator (the stock of payment savings) is increasing in each period.

Table 6: The Average Marginal Propensity to Save at Different Horizons

| | Δ Savings | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) At 2011Q3 | (2) 2011Q4 | (3) 2012Q1 | (4) Q2 | (5) Q3 | (6) Q4 | (7) 2013Q1 |
| Δ Payment Savings 2011Q3- | 0.023 (0.0519) | 0.058 (0.1263) | 0.093 (0.0564) | 0.135* (0.0574) | 0.144** (0.0528) | 0.108* (0.0459) | 0.094* (0.0434) |
| Observations | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.064 | 0.004 | -0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.000 |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| | Δ Savings | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | (8) Q2 | (9) Q3 | (10) Q4 | (11) 2014Q1 | (12) Q2 | (13) Q3 | (14) Q4 |
| Δ Payment Savings 2011Q3- | 0.083* (0.0387) | 0.081* (0.0353) | 0.075* (0.0294) | 0.074** (0.0268) | 0.074** (0.0247) | 0.084** (0.0283) | 0.093*** (0.0266) |
| Observations | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: This table reports estimates from regression equation 5 (differences). The dependent variable is the change in household i 's bank account balance ("Savings"), $b_{i,t+j}$ between 2011Q3 and the various horizons specified in the titles. The independent variable is the change in household i 's stock of payment savings $m_{i,t+j}^{stock}$, at the same horizon as the dependent variable. All variables are in euros. Controls include current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, deciles of total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by quarter. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

infeasible to estimate the impact of any given period's shock while controlling for shocks that occurred in neighboring periods. Relatedly, we are unable to estimate event study specifications because we do not observe a pre-period. Our estimates remain valid under our exogeneity assumption, and the small difference shown in column 1 reassuringly suggests that both groups are similar that at the beginning of the shock.

4.2 Heterogeneous savings responses

Next we report estimates for the savings response along three dimensions of heterogeneity: (i) initial bank balance; (ii) the persistence of the income shock; and (iii) the type of savings account (checking account, savings account, or mortgage balance reductions). We examine heterogeneity by initial bank balance and by the persistence of the income shock, because these are dimensions on which standard theories predict heterogeneous responses. We compare these estimates to model simulations in Section

5. We look at heterogeneity in savings account type as a test for the importance of missing savings due to unobservable savings outside our bank. Firstly, we test how our estimates change for households with (i) only have a checking account, versus (ii) both a checking and a savings account; where the latter group likely have a greater share of total savings observable at our bank. Secondly, we test whether we are missing savings due to reductions in debt by estimating the response of mortgage pre-payments to the income shock.

Heterogeneity by liquid assets. Table 7 reports the savings response for each quartile of the bank balance distribution. We group households based on their bank balances in 2013Q4, which is the first date at which we observe their savings. The savings response is monotonically increasing as bank balances increase. We estimate that households in the upper quartile of the balance distribution saved 18.4 percent of the payment savings (column 4), the third quartile saved 7 percent (column 3), the second quartile saved 5.2 percent (column 2) and the bottom quartile did not save any of the payment savings (-0.001, column 1). The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the upper quartile and at the 5 percent level for the second quartile. The results are not statistically significantly different from zero for the lowest or third quartile, however, the response of the lowest quartile is a precisely estimated zero, the coefficient is -0.001 and the standard error is 0.01, which implies that all but the third quartile are precisely estimated. The final row strongly rejects the hypothesis that the MPC of each group is zero using a t-test of $\beta = 1$.

The magnitude of the differences in the MPC across the liquid asset distribution is large when compared against the response to one-time shocks. For instance, Fagereng, Holm and Natvik (2021) estimate that the MPC out of a one-time lottery payment is 62 percent for the bottom quartile and 46 percent for the top quartile, which at a 16 percentage point spread is slightly smaller than our estimated 18.4 percentage point spread. This is surprisingly large if your prior was that differences in MPCs arising from liquidity constraints should be smaller for persistent shocks than for one-time shocks.¹⁹

We acknowledge that the grouping of our bank balance quartiles is based on bank balances that we observe several years after the shock initially occurred. In principle,

¹⁹See for instance Campbell (2023)’s video discussing the redistribution channel of monetary policy [13 minutes onwards]. He argues that the redistribution channel of monetary policy only works for transitory changes in interest rates because for permanent changes every household will have the same MPC of one. Our results suggest that large differences in MPCs remain even when the shock is highly persistent.

Table 7: The Marginal Propensity to Save by Liquid Asset Quartile

| | Δ Savings | | | | Δ Log Savings | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) Lower | (2) Quartile 2 | (3) Quartile 3 | (4) Upper | (5) Lower | (6) Quartile 2 | (7) Quartile 3 | (8) Upper |
| D.Payment Savings | -0.001 (0.0106) | 0.052** (0.0219) | 0.070 (0.0416) | 0.184*** (0.0542) | | | | |
| D.Log Payment Savings | | | | | -0.023 (0.0596) | 0.099 (0.0598) | 0.122*** (0.0350) | 0.066*** (0.0091) |
| Observations | 35828 | 31057 | 32006 | 35672 | 35828 | 31057 | 32006 | 35672 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.000 | 0.006 | 0.015 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.009 |
| Individual FE | | | | | | | | |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: This table reports estimates from regression equation 5 where the sample is split by quartiles of the bank balance distribution. The dependent variable is the change in household i 's bank account balance ("Savings"), $b_{i,t+1}$. The independent variable is the change in the stock of payment savings $m_{i,t+1}^{stock}$. Variable names indicate euro and log specifications. Controls are current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, deciles of total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by quarter. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

households could switch between quartiles if the savings response was non-monotonic over these quartiles. That said, our estimates are monotonic. We estimate that those who initially had the least savings continue to save the least and this implies that the ordering of households in the bank balance distribution does not change in response to the shock.

Columns 5-8 report the results in log differences, which similarly show that the elasticity of savings with respect to the payment shock is larger for households with higher initial balances. The elasticities are not, however, monotonic with the upper quartile reporting a lower elasticity than the third quartile. It is possible that this is driven by the fact that higher quartile households start from a higher based level of savings. For completeness, Table B2 in the appendix reports the estimates in levels rather than level differences. The estimates are similar with the highest quartile saving 18 percent and the lowest quartile reducing savings by one percent.

Heterogeneity by the persistence of the income shock. Table 8 reports the savings response by the persistence of the shock. We group households based on the time to maturity as on 2008 Q4. Since the payment savings end with the maturity of the mortgage, households with a longer time to maturity receive a more persistent

shock. We define three groups, those with less than or equal to 5 years, those with between 6 and ten years, and those with greater than ten years. We define the groups on 2008 Q4, which is just before the shock occurred. Columns 1-3 report our preferred estimates in euro differences while columns 4-6 report the estimates in log differences. Each of the specifications include a full set of controls.

Table 8: The Marginal Propensity to Save by Persistence

| | Δ Savings | | | Δ Log Savings | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) ≤ 5 years | (2) 6 – 10 years | (3) > 10 years | (4) ≤ 5 years | (5) 6 – 10 years | (6) > 10 years |
| D.Payment Savings | 0.389* (0.2053) | 0.162 (0.1171) | 0.075** (0.0252) | | | |
| D.Log Payment Savings | | | | 0.138*** (0.0352) | 0.003 (0.0352) | 0.041 (0.0387) |
| Observations | 11011 | 24232 | 99320 | 11011 | 24232 | 99320 |
| Adjusted R^2 | -0.002 | 0.006 | 0.003 | -0.008 | -0.004 | 0.003 |
| Individual FE | | | | | | |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | 0.012 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: This table reports estimates from regression equation 5 where the sample is split into groups based on the time to maturity of each household’s mortgage at 2008 Q4. The dependent variable is the change in household i’s bank account balance (“Savings”), $b_{i,t+1}$. The independent variable is the change in the stock of payment savings $m_{i,t+1}^{stock}$. Columns 1 and 4 reports estimates for household with a time to maturity less than 5 years, columns 2 and 5 report estimates for households with a time to maturity between 6 and ten years, and columns 3 and 6 report estimates for households with a time to maturity greater than ten years. The left three columns report estimates for euro differences and the right three columns report estimates for log differences. Controls are current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code, year of origination of first lien, deciles of total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by quarter. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The savings response is largest for those with the least persistent shock. Households with up to 5 years remaining on the mortgage save 39 percent of the payment savings. Households with between 6 and 10 years remaining save 16 percent of the payment savings. Households with over 10 years remaining saved 8 percent. The estimate for the most persistent shock is close to the average response in Table 5, which is not surprising given that the vast majority of households are in this group. The shortest and longest time horizon results are statistically significant at the 10 and 5 percent level respectively, while the estimate for 6-10 years is marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level. This is novel quasi-experimental evidence in favor of a central prediction

of modern consumption-savings theory that the savings response is stronger for more persistent shocks.

Heterogeneity by savings account type. Table 9 reports the total savings response for split samples based on accounts held. In addition to providing information about how households savings, this is a robustness test of whether missing savings held in alternative accounts. Column (1) reports the savings response for everyone in our sample, column (2) is for those who have a checking account, column (3) is for those who have a savings account. These are overlapping samples as most savings account holders also hold a checking account at our bank. We report the total savings response for these holders of these account types, so column (3) reports the savings in both checking and savings accounts as a fraction of the income shock for the sample of savings account holders.

Table 9: The Marginal Propensity to Save, by Account Types

| | Savings | | | | Log Savings | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| | (1) Total | (2) Checking a/c | (3) Savings a/c | (4) Mortgage prepay | (5) Total | (6) Checking a/c | (7) Savings a/c | (8) Mortgage prepay |
| D.Payment Savings | 0.086*** (0.0219) | 0.095*** (0.0233) | 0.016 (0.0519) | 0.045 (0.1939) | | | | |
| D.Log Payment Savings | | | | | 0.059** (0.0217) | 0.059** (0.0226) | 0.068** (0.0298) | -0.135 (0.1363) |
| Observations | 134563 | 122720 | 37531 | 144914 | 134563 | 122720 | 37531 | 144144 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.003 | -0.002 | 0.058 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: This table reports estimates from regression equation 5, for different types of savings account types. In the first three columns, the dependent variable is the change in household i 's bank account balance ("Savings"), $b_{i,t+1}$. The samples are split by whether we observe a checking or savings account: column 1 includes households with either account; column 2 includes only households with a checking account; and column 3 includes households with only a savings account. In column 4 the dependent variable is the change in mortgage prepayment. For all four columns, the independent variable is the change in the stock of payment savings $m_{i,t+1}^{stock}$. Variables are in euros. Controls include current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, deciles of total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by quarter. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

For households with a savings account, the average propensity to save is 1.6 percent. This is not statistically significant, however the standard error is small (0.05) suggesting that it is estimated with reasonable precision. One limitation of our data is that we only observe savings within a single institution, therefore one could be concerned that

our estimates of a small savings responses are missing savings in other institutions. To test this, we look at households in column 3 for whom we observe the savings (and the vast majority of whom we also observe the checking account). That the savings response is *smaller* for this group, reassuringly suggests that most savings occurs in the checking account. Thus, if we observed the savings accounts for households in other banks, we might not estimate a much larger savings propensity.

Another avenue for savings that is missing in our main estimates is the reduction of debt, for instance by prepaying mortgage debt. Column (4) reports the fraction of the income shock that is used to *voluntarily* prepay mortgages. There is a *mechanical* reduction in the outstanding balance for tracker mortgages, that we exclude from this measure of prepayment. Since mortgage payments based on the annuity formula and fixed over time, lower interest rates imply a fast payment of the principle. Since we want to know the MPC out of the disposable income arising from reductions in payments, our mortgage prepayment measure only includes additional voluntary prepayment and not this mechanical balance reduction.

We estimate that 4.5 percent of payment savings are used to pre-pay mortgage debt, though the estimate is not statistically significant. While the point estimate suggests that our average savings response could be about 50 percent higher, this does not change our conclusion that the average MPC very high. This implies that we are not missing a large amount of savings via reduction in mortgage balances. Combined, these results suggest that the MPC is indeed high, as reported in our main estimate. There is little evidence that we are missing an economically meaningful amount of savings for households for whom we do not observe savings accounts, nor are households savings by pre-paying mortgage debt.

Re-Capping Heterogeneity The results so far imply that in response to persistent shocks (i) on average households spent most of the extra income, (ii) households with fewer savings spend more of the income, and (iii) households who receive less persistent income changes save more of the income. These are qualitatively consistent with a standard consumption-savings model with borrowing constraints. In such a model, household wish to smooth consumption over time. To do smooth transitory shocks over time they adjust savings. Since persistent shocks occur over many periods then consuming more of the shock when it is received naturally smooths consumption. With borrowing constraints, households with low balances can become liquidity constrained and therefore, when they get additional income, they increase their consumption more

than households who are not liquidity constrained. Our empirical results on heterogeneity across the bank balance distribution implies that liquidity constraints matter even in response to persistent shocks. Though the covariance of the estimates is qualitatively consistent with a standard consumption savings model, in section 5 we test how close the average and heterogeneous responses match with the predictions of a quantitative model.

4.3 Robustness

Reversing the sign of the shock. Our identification comes from a relative change in mortgage payments between our tracker and variable rate mortgage holders. We have referred to the tracker group as the treated group and constructed the shock as a positive disposable income shock for this group. In theory, at least in the case of a simple difference-in-difference estimation, our results should be the same (with the sign changed) if we switch the definition of which groups is treated. In practice, the results are likely to differ because we use regressions to adjust for covariates and our treatment variable is continuous in intensity. Both of these features may alter the underlying weights of observations in the regressions (for example, Fagereng et al. (2021) show that observations who receive bigger shocks will receive greater weight).

Table B3 reports the results when we reverse the treatment group, so the variable rate group are treated and the tracker rate group are controls. We continue to define the payment savings as a positive number for the treated group and zero for the untreated group. It therefore should be interpreted as the *increase in payments* for the variable rate group. Based on specifications in level and level differences, we estimate that households reduce their savings by 5.8-9.9 dollars in response to a 100 dollar increase in payments, and our benchmark estimate of 8.6 percent result lies within this range (with the sign reversed).

Including defaulters in the sample. Our primary sample excludes households who default on their mortgage during or before the start of our sample, where default is defined as being more than 90 days behind on scheduled mortgage payments. We prefer to exclude these households, because there is no payment difference between them while they are not making payments. To ensure that this sample selection is not an important driver of our results, Table B4 reports the savings response while including the group of households who default during our sample. Based on our preferred specification, in column 7, households in this sample save 5.7 percent of the payment savings. It is not

too surprising that the estimate is closer to zero because we are including households in the tracker and variable group who are in fact closer to each other because neither is making payments. While the estimate in this sample is lower than our main estimate of 8.6 percent, it reinforces our conclusion that the savings response is close to zero.

Households balance sheets across the liquid asset distribution. In section 2 we showed that deposits represent 78 percent of financial assets for the average household. However, our estimates of savings across the liquid asset distribution could be biased if some quartiles were more likely to hold savings in other financial assets, such as stocks or bonds. To test this, Table B6 reports deposits as a share of financial assets for each quartile of liquid assets. Reassuringly, there are minimal differences in the share of deposits across the liquid asset distribution, with each quartile holding between 76 and 79 percent of their financial assets in deposits.

5 Consumption-Savings Model

In this section we study a benchmark incomplete markets consumption-savings model and evaluate its ability to match our estimates.

5.1 Model Description

Infinitely lived households choose consumption c and savings a to maximize the present discounted value of present discounted value of utility $\mathbf{E}_0 [\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)]$, where u has the constant relative risk aversion form, $\frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$. Endowments follow an AR(1) process in logs, $\ln e_t = \rho_e \ln e_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$, which we approximate with n_e idiosyncratic states that have a probability $\mathcal{P}(e, e')$ of transitioning between e and e' . Households can save in a risk free asset at a constant interest rate r and face a borrowing constraint $a \geq \underline{a}$. We model our income shock using an exogenous sequence of lump-sum transfers or taxes $\{\tau_s\}$ over which households have perfect foresight.

The value function of a household in state (e, a) at time t is therefore

$$V_t(e, a) = \max_{c, a'} \left\{ \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \sum_{e'} V_{t+1}(e', a') \mathcal{P}(e, e') \right\} \quad (8)$$

$$c + a' = (1 + r)a + e + \tau_t$$

$$a' \geq \underline{a}.$$

We purposefully keep the model as simple as possible to evaluate the estimated responses. It incorporates heterogeneity in bank balances via the endogenous distribution of assets a and can incorporate heterogeneity in the length of the income shock via the sequence $\{\tau_s\}$. The model nests the representative-agent permanent income case when $n_e = 1$ and $\underline{a} = -\infty$.

Denote by $c_t^*(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau})$ and $a_t^*(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau})$ the policy functions that solve the Bellman equation (8). Here we make it explicit that these depend on the idiosyncratic state of the household (e, a) as well as the sequence of transfers $\boldsymbol{\tau}$. We also denote by $D_t(e, \mathcal{A}) \equiv \Pr(e_t = e, a_t \in \mathcal{A})$ the measure of households in state e that have savings in a set \mathcal{A} at the start of date t . This distribution has a standard law of motion $D_{t+1}(e', \mathcal{A}') = \sum_e D_t(e, a_t^{*-1}(e, \mathcal{A})) \mathcal{P}(e, e')$.

5.2 Consumption Responses

In our experiments we compute the response of consumption to a perfect foresight path of constant transfers $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ and compare this to steady state consumption when there are no transfers $\tau_{ss} = 0$.

$$mpc_t(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau}) \equiv \frac{dc_t(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau})}{d\tau} = \frac{[c_t^*(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau}) - c_{ss}^*(e, a, \mathbf{0})]}{\tau}. \quad (9)$$

Note that since our shock is persistent, our definition of the mpc is the total change in consumption at time t divided by the total change in the transfer τ . This is different to the usual definition as the partial derivative of consumption with respect to income today $\frac{\partial c_t(e, a)}{\partial \tau_t}$ (e.g. Auclert, Rognlie and Straub (2023)). When the shock is constant, our definition corresponds to the sum of the partial derivatives of consumption with respect to income at every future period

$$\frac{dc_t(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau})}{d\tau} = \sum_{s=t}^{t+T} \frac{\partial c_t(e, a)}{\partial \tau_s}, \quad (10)$$

where T is the length of the sequence of transfers.²⁰ The definition $mpc_t(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau})$ also highlights that the consumption response depends on the length of the sequence of trans-

²⁰In the case of non-constant transfers, the consumption response is

$$dc_t(e, a; \boldsymbol{\tau}) = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{\partial c_t(e, a)}{\partial \tau_s} d\tau_s.$$

fers τ as well as on the individual states (e, a) . We can also aggregate the consumption response across consumers to give an average consumption $C_t(\tau) = \sum_e \int_a c_t^*(e, a; \tau) D_t(e, a)$ and the average *MPC*

$$MPC_t(\tau) = [C_t(\tau) - C_{ss}(0)] / \tau. \quad (11)$$

To be consistent with our empirical estimates, we define the average savings response MPS_t as the cumulative savings relative to the total transfer received up to that point in time

$$MPS_t(\tau) = [A_t(\tau) - A_{ss}(0)] / \left(\sum_{s=0}^t \tau_s \right). \quad (12)$$

Since savings are a stock, this reports the average savings of the cumulative shock and is thus consistent with how we estimate the empirical savings response.

5.3 Model Experiment

Our model experiment considers the response to a perfect foresight path to transfers $\{\tau_s\}_{s \geq 0}$. This formulation implicitly assumes that, at the time at which it occurred, households perfectly anticipated the length of the shock. While there was naturally some uncertainty about how long the spread between the two interest rates would last, it is reasonable for households to have expected that it was very persistent.²¹ We approximate the path of the empirical shock, as shown in Figure 4, with a sequence where the size of the transfer is the same in every period. For our benchmark experiment, the length of the shock is 68, which matches the average length of the shock in our data. Figure 5 illustrates this, showing both the flow transfers and the cumulative (“stock”) transfers received at each date.

5.4 Model Quantification

Table 10 reports the parameter values that we use to quantify the model. The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency, which is the same frequency of our data. We set the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution to 2 and the real interest rate to 0.01, as is standard in the literature (Auclert, Bardoczy, Rognlie and Straub, 2021) and

²¹The perfect foresight assumption is also an implicit assumption in any macro model that makes a first order approximation (Auclert, Bardoczy, Rognlie and Straub, 2021).




Figure 5: Transfer Shock in the Benchmark Model Experiment

Note: Figure reports the transfer shock that is the benchmark model experiment. The left panel shows the per period shock, which is the same size in every period until the 68th period. The right panel shows the cumulative shock, which is the sum of the per period shocks.

is consistent with the low real interest rates on savings in the data during this time. In the absence of an estimate for the persistence of income shocks in Ireland, we follow the same procedure as de Ferra, Mitman and Romei (2020). We use an estimate of the persistence from the US of 0.966 (Auclert, Bardoczy, Rognlie and Straub, 2021) and estimate the variance of log residual earnings σ_{data}^2 in Ireland using the second wave (2014) of the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). With these two parameters we can compute the variance the income shock, $\sigma_\epsilon^2 = \sigma_{data}^2 \times (1 - \rho_\epsilon^2) = 0.44 \times 0.066 = 0.029$ (Krueger, Mitman and Perri, 2016). Since our model is non-linearly, the size of the transfer shock that we feed in could affect the consumption response. We set the size of the transfer shock τ to 0.05 to match the average size of the payment shock relative to incomes.

We estimate the discount factor to match the average *MPC* in the data. This involves finding a single parameter to match a single moment and therefore we can exactly match the MPC in the data (0.91) with a discount factor $\beta = 0.986$. Alternatively, we could have used a standard value of the discount factor and then evaluated the fit of the model based on the discrepancy between the model and data’s average MPC. This approach yields and similar conclusion about model fit, since our estimated discount factor $\beta = 0.986$ is remarkably close the standard value $\beta = 0.982$ used by Auclert,

Table 10: Model Quantification

| Parameter | Description | Value | Source |
|--------------|--|-------|-----------------------|
| σ | Inverse Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution | 2 | Auclert et al. (2021) |
| r | Real Interest Rate | 0.01 | Auclert et al. (2021) |
| ρ_e | Persistence of Income Risk | 0.966 | Auclert et al. (2021) |
| σ_e^2 | Variance of Income Risk | 0.029 | HFCS (2014) |
| τ | Transfer Shock Size | 0.05 | Internal Estimation |
| β | Discount Factor | 0.97 | Internal Estimation |

Note: Table reports the calibration of the model parameters. The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. We use a standard calibration of an incomplete markets model with idiosyncratic income risk, following Auclert, Bardoczy, Rognlie and Straub (2021). We calibrate the size of the transfer shock τ using the average size of the payment shock relative to income the data. We estimate the discount factor β to match the average *MPC* in the data. We estimate the variance of income risk using the second wave (2014) of the ECB’s Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) for Ireland.

Bardoczy, Rognlie and Straub (2021) in their calibration of a Krussel-Smith economy²². We consider this evidence that our empirical estimates are consistent with a standard calibration of a consumption-savings model. Targeting the average MPC better allows us to evaluate the fit of the model using the heterogeneous responses. Otherwise, we might be concerned that any mismatch on the heterogeneous responses was affected by a mismatch on the average MPC.

5.5 Results

Figure 6 plots the response of savings (in the left panel) and consumption (in the right panel) to our benchmark 69 quarter transfer shock. The line shows the model’s simulated response and the dot is our preferred estimate from Table 5. The model is simulated for more periods than we observe in the data, so the pink shaded area highlights period during which the model and data overlap. Households consume the vast majority of the shock; they spend 95 percent of the transfer on impact and 91 percent during the pink shaded period. Even though households spend the majority of the shock, they also save to smooth the increase in consumption over time. Savings rise until the end of the transfer shock period and then fall back to their steady state level. At the end of the sequence of transfers, household have saved 23 percent of the *cumulative* transfer, which enables consumption to remain above its steady state level

²²The average MPC of our model with the discount factor of Auclert, Bardoczy, Rognlie and Straub (2021) is 1.0. This is higher than our MPC of 0.91, but still represents a good fit relative to the large differences between model and data for transitory shocks.

after the shock has stopped. Indeed, in the quarter that the shock ends, consumption falls from consuming 51 percent to 49 percent of the flow transfer.





Figure 6: Savings and Consumption Responses to the Benchmark Model Experiment **Note:** Figure reports the average savings and consumption responses to the benchmark model experiment. The line is the model’s simulated path. The dot is the data estimate. The gray shaded area is the time period over which the model and data overlap. The sequence of transfers is reported in Figure 5.

Figure 6 shows that the model exactly matches the average consumption response during the period when the model and data overlap. As noted in the quantification, while this is a targeted moment, the reasonable value of the discount factor suggests that the model is not too far from the data. Next we consider the heterogeneous responses.

Figure 7 plots the heterogeneous responses of consumption. The left panel (7a) plots the response of households split by quartiles of liquid assets in response to the benchmark shock length. The right panel (7b) plots the average response of households for different shock lengths. As in the previous figure, the lines are model outputs, the dots are data estimates from section 4, and the pink shaded area is the period of overlap between the model and data.

The left panel (7a) shows that model fits the heterogeneous response by liquid assets well. Table 11 reports the model and data consumption responses, and column (3) reports the difference between the model and data for each quartile. The model’s



(a) By Quartile of Liquid Asset Balances

(b) By Persistence of the Shock

Figure 7: Heterogeneous Consumption Response, Model Versus Data

Note: Figures reports the heterogeneous consumption responses to the transfer shock. The left plots consumption responses by liquid assets under the benchmark experiment. The right plots the average consumption responses for three shocks that differ in their persistence. In each plot the lines are the model's simulated path and the dots are the data estimates. The light pink shaded areas are the time period over which the model and data overlap.

response varies between 0.72 for those with the most liquid assets to 1.03 for those with the least liquid assets. Like we seen in the data, the model MPC is monotonically decreasing as liquid assets increase. Three of quartiles are within 5 percentage points of the data estimate and the remaining quartile is within ten percentage points. We consider this a good fit. The only feature of the model that generates this heterogeneity in consumption response is the presence of liquidity constraints. In the presence of liquidity constraints, households who receive negative shocks and approach the borrowing constraint are not able to borrow to sustain their consumption. Additional income thus alleviates the constraint for these households with low liquid assets but not for those with higher liquid assets. And this results in a larger consumption response for those with low liquid assets. Therefore, the fact that the model fits this form of heterogeneity well is evidence in favor of the theory that liquidity constraints are important for the consumption response to shocks. While it is well known that liquidity constraints can generate larger responses for households with lower liquid assets, our results provide novel theoretical and empirical evidence that liquidity constraints are quantitatively

important even for highly persistent shocks.

Table 11: Heterogeneous Consumption Response, Model Versus Data

| | (1) Data MPC | (2) Model MPC | (3) Difference |
|--|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Panel A: Heterogeneity By Liquid Assets</i> | | | |
| Highest Quartile | 1.001 | 1.026 | -0.025 |
| 3rd Quartile | 0.948 | 0.995 | -0.047 |
| 2nd Quartile | 0.93 | 0.882 | 0.048 |
| Lowest Quartile | 0.816 | 0.72 | 0.096 |
| <i>Panel B: Heterogeneity By Shock Persistence</i> | | | |
| Most Persistent | 0.92 | 1.0 | -0.07 |
| Middle | 0.84 | 0.53 | 0.31 |
| Least Persistent | 0.61 | 0.27 | 0.34 |

Note: Table reports the average MPC in the data (column 1) and model (column 2), and the difference between them (column 3). Estimates are reported for three groups of households based on the persistence of the shock. The data estimates are from Tables 7 and 8.

The right panel (7b) shows the model fits the heterogeneous response by the length of the shock less well. The model and data have the same covariance between the length of the shock and the consumption response. More persistent shocks have larger consumption responses, as predicted by the permanent income hypothesis. For the most persistent shock, the model's consumption response is only 6 percentage points higher than the empirical estimate, which is perhaps unsurprising given that the model matches the average response and this shock lasts only 13 more quarters. However, the model performs less well for the less persistent shocks. Table 11 reports that the model's response is 34 percentage points lower than the empirical estimate of 0.61 for the least persistent shock of 15 quarters. The model's response is also 31 percentage points under the empirical estimates for the moderately persistent shock (31 quarters). Taken together, these estimates suggest that the model predicts too much variation in the consumption response by the length of the shock. While the covariance suggest that the persistence of the shock does indeed predicts the size of the consumption response, the model under-performs quantitatively. This result that the model performs worst for the least persistent shocks is consistent with the prior literature (Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland, 2013; Fagereng, Holm and Natvik, 2021) that finds that the standard model's consumption response is too small in the case of one-time shocks.

5.6 Comparing to Models of One-Time Shocks

To provide some context for our results, we discuss our model’s response to a one-time shock as shown in Figure C2. The average MPC is 4.3 percent, which is similar to the 4.6 percent that Kaplan and Violante (2022) report in the benchmark calibration of a one-asset model. This is an order of magnitude lower than the empirical estimates of MPCs, such as Fagereng, Holm and Natvik (2021) who estimate an MPC of 53 percent using lottery winners. It is in this context that we consider the fit of the model’s response to persistent shocks to be a success. The model can fit the average response with reasonable parameters values, and the heterogeneous responses are within ten percentage points for the liquid assets. As we’ve acknowledged, the 34 percentage point difference for less persistent shocks shows the limitation of the one-asset model for transitory shocks. Overall though, the model’s response to these persistent shocks is much closer to the empirical estimates than the model’s response to a one-time shock.

The literature on one-time shocks has also found mixed results regarding the importance of liquidity constraints. Like our approach, the literature has tested whether households with low liquid assets have higher consumption responses as suggested by a model, like ours, with liquidity constraints. Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland (2013) find that such households have *lower* MPCs in response to the United States’ 2008 fiscal stimulus checks, while Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2001) find that they have *higher* MPCs when studying the 2001 stimulus checks. Likewise Kueng (2018), while studying the Alaska Permanent Fund, finds that there is little clear variation across households who differ in liquid assets and that high-income households with large liquid assets display excess sensitivity with MPCs above 50 percent. On the other hand, Fagereng, Holm and Natvik (2021) find that households with low liquid assets have higher MPCs in response to lottery winnings in Norway. Our results suggest that liquidity constraints are quantitatively important for the consumption response to persistent shocks.

One potential explanation for these discrepancies is that the cumulative size of our shock is much larger than the size of the shocks in the previous literature. As shown in Figure 4, the median household received over €12,000 by 2014Q1, compared with between \$600 and \$1,200 per couple in the 2008 stimulus checks. Kueng (2018) shows that the welfare loss from mis-spending a transfer is increasing in the size of the transfer relative to consumption. In the case of smaller transfers, this can rationalize high MPCs for richer households, because the welfare loss is small compared to following

an optimization problem. As shocks get larger, like in our setting, the incentive to optimally save is higher, and therefore we can better detect the impact of liquidity constraints in the higher MPCs of poorer households.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, we use a natural experiment in Ireland to provide novel identification of persistent income shocks with varying degrees of persistence. Our findings provide valuable insights into household behavior in the face of long-lasting changes in disposable income. We find that households exhibit a relatively high average marginal propensity to consume when confronted with such persistent shocks.

Importantly, our results highlight a noteworthy contrast between persistent shocks and temporary income shocks. In the case of persistent shocks, our findings show that the standard consumption-savings model aligns well with the empirical evidence. The model’s predictions regarding the MPC closely match the observed consumption responses, suggesting its relevance for understanding household behavior in the presence of prolonged income fluctuations. This stands in stark contrast to temporary income shocks, where significant discrepancies exist between the standard model’s predictions and empirical estimates of the MPC.

Furthermore, our analysis uncovers heterogeneity in consumption responses. Households with limited liquid assets display higher MPCs. Additionally, we find that the length of the shock’s persistence positively correlates with the MPC, with households facing longer remaining mortgage maturities exhibiting higher consumption propensities.

By shedding light on the marginal propensity to save and consume in the context of persistent income shocks, our findings contribute to a better understanding of household behavior and its implications for macroeconomic dynamics. These insights underscore the importance of considering individual heterogeneity in macroeconomic models and policy analysis. We hope that our findings provide valuable guidance for policymakers and contribute to the ongoing dialogue surrounding macroeconomic stabilization measures.

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
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A Appendix to Section 2: Data

Figure A1: Box plot Change in (Flow) Payment Savings, Quarterly 2011Q2 - 2015Q4

(a)



Note: Plot shows the change in the payment pavings at a quarterly frequency. Payment savings are in euros.

Table A1 presents the results of sequentially adding variables to a survey of mortgage holders post-shock, in order to investigate which controls have the biggest impact on the outcome variable. The table includes seven columns, each corresponding to a different specification with additional controls. The first column presents the results of the baseline regression, which includes only the treatment variable and no controls. The second column adds bank fixed effects, while the third column adds the variable for the origin year of the mortgage. The table shows that controlling for origin year and initial income of the borrower matter the most for explaining differences in income changes for tracker versus variable rate holders. This is intuitive because income shocks after the financial crisis did not occur uniform across the income distribution. However, once controlling for the ex ante differences in income, there are small and statistically insignificant differences in income changes (2.8 percent) between tracker and variable

rate borrowers. This suggests that our assumption that the tracker and variable rate borrowers are as good as randomly assigned conditional on observables is a reasonable assumption.

Table A1: Exposure of Tracker Holders to Ex-Post Income Changes

| | Income Change | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| | (1) None | (2) Bank | (3) Origin year | (4) Age | (5) Income | (6) LTV | (7) First time buyer |
| Tracker | -0.254*** (0.0683) | -0.233** (0.0723) | -0.129 (0.0774) | -0.132 (0.0795) | 0.034 (0.0607) | 0.028 (0.0609) | 0.028 (0.0610) |
| Observations | 616 | 616 | 616 | 597 | 597 | 595 | 595 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.020 | 0.026 | 0.044 | 0.063 | 0.463 | 0.464 | 0.463 |
| Origin year and bank FE | | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls | | | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Note: This table reports the same regression as (column 3) of Table 3, which tests whether tracker mortgage holders were more likely to experience changes in income between mortgage origination and the survey data. The columns report the results of sequentially adding fixed effects and controls, with column 7 corresponding to main specification. Source: Survey of Mortgage Holders 2012-13 and Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

Table A2 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the effect of education on the outcome variable in a survey of mortgage holders post-shock. The table includes three variables, each corresponds to a different level of education: primary, secondary, and higher. The estimated coefficients represent the change in the outcome variable associated with each level of education, relative to the omitted category (primary). The table shows that the results are not statistically significant, indicating that there is little evidence that tracker borrowers have better education than non-tracker borrowers. Column one shows that tracker borrowers are more likely to have a third-level higher degree. However, controlling for the year and bank reverses this association. This suggests that there may be differences in the education of the types of borrowers who borrowed at different points in the boom, and that tracker mortgages were also more likely to be sold in later years (since it was a new product). That said, once we control for these associations, there is no remaining association between those who took tracker mortgages and their education status.

Table A2: Ex-Ante Selection by Education Status

| | Tracker | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Primary | 0.000 (.) | 0.000 (.) | 0.000 (.) |
| Secondary | -0.045 (0.0772) | -0.088 (0.0687) | -0.135 (0.0700) |
| Higher | 0.097 (0.0675) | -0.028 (0.0604) | -0.094 (0.0640) |
| Observations | 605 | 605 | 593 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.011 | 0.234 | 0.252 |
| Origin year and bank FE | | Yes | Yes |
| Controls | | | Yes |

Note: Table reports a linear probability model using educational attainment to predict whether a households is a tracker (versus variable) rate mortgage holder. Column 1 includes no controls, column 2 include bank and year fixed effects, and column 3 additionally includes controls for age, income, LTV and first-time buyer status. Source: Survey of Mortgage Holders 2012-13 and Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland.

B Appendix to Section 4: Empirical results

B.1 Heterogeneity in levels

Table B1: The Marginal Propensity to Save out of payment shocks, by checking and savings account types

| | Savings | | | | Log Savings | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| | (1) Total | (2) Checking a/c | (3) Savings a/c | (4) Mortgage prepay | (5) Total | (6) Checking a/c | (7) Savings a/c | (8) Mortgage prepay |
| Payment Savings | 0.077*** (0.0242) | 0.088*** (0.0262) | 0.019 (0.0504) | -0.027 (0.0374) | | | | |
| Log Payment Savings | | | | | 0.076** (0.0326) | 0.077 (.) | 0.102* (0.0543) | 0.107 (0.1761) |
| Observations | 144914 | 132160 | 40418 | 144914 | 144914 | 132160 | 40418 | 144301 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.903 | 0.893 | 0.929 | 0.203 | 0.907 | 0.890 | 0.958 | 0.677 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | . | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Controls include current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effects.

Table B2: The Marginal Propensity to Save out of payment shocks, by quartiles of the balance distribution

| | Savings | | | | Log Savings | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) Lower | (2) Quartile 2 | (3) Quartile 3 | (4) Upper | (5) Lower | (6) Quartile 2 | (7) Quartile 3 | (8) Upper |
| Payment Savings | -0.007 (0.0073) | 0.044** (0.0209) | 0.038 (0.0439) | 0.180** (0.0702) | | | | |
| Log Payment Savings | | | | | 0.018 (0.0518) | 0.156*** (0.0583) | 0.138** (0.0674) | 0.085* (0.0437) |
| Observations | 38584 | 33446 | 34468 | 38416 | 38584 | 33446 | 34468 | 38416 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.506 | 0.413 | 0.471 | 0.854 | 0.742 | 0.521 | 0.563 | 0.756 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: This table reports estimates from regression equation 7 where the sample is split by quartiles of the bank balance distribution. The dependent variable is household i 's bank account balance ("Savings"), $b_{i,t}$. The independent variable is household i 's stock of payment savings $m_{i,t}^{stock}$. Variable names indicate euro and log specifications. Controls are current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, deciles of total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are double clustered by quarter and individual. Source: Merged Bank-Mortgage Dataset, Central Bank of Ireland. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

B.2 Negative shock

In the main paper, the shock is defined as a positive payment saving for tracker mortgage holders and zero savings for variable rate mortgage holders. However, we can also define the shock as a payment shock for variable rate mortgage holders and a zero shock for tracker mortgage holders. The payment difference is still defined as a positive number, so that we can take logs, and it represents the *increase* in the payments for the variable rate group. In this case we expect that it would be associated with a decline in savings. Table B3 reports the results for this specification and as expected the coefficients are negative. The coefficient is a similar magnitude to the main specification, with a savings decline of 6 percent of the payment difference (column 3). The implied MPC is also high at 94 percent, implying that even if we think of the shock as increasing the mortgage payments for variable rate holders, most of the response comes from consumption rather than savings.

Table B3: The Marginal Propensity to Save out of payment shocks, negative shock

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | Savings | Log Savings | Δ Savings | Δ Log Savings | Savings | Log Savings | Δ Savings | Δ Log Savings |
| Cumulative Payment Difference | -0.063 (.) | | | | -0.099*** (0.0221) | | | |
| Log Cumulative Payment Difference | | -0.039** (0.0156) | | | | -0.037** (0.0152) | | |
| D.Cumulative Payment Difference | | | -0.058 (0.0397) | | | | -0.083* (0.0452) | |
| D.Log Cumulative Payment Difference | | | | 0.003 (0.0111) | | | | 0.003 (0.0101) |
| Observations | 144914 | 144845 | 134563 | 134493 | 144848 | 144779 | 134502 | 134432 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.902 | 0.907 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.903 | 0.907 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | | | Yes | Yes | | |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | | | | | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | . | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Controls include current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, loan to income as of 2008 Q4, loan to value as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effects.

B.3 Defaulter sample

The main sample excludes households who default before or during our sample, because the concept of payment savings does not apply to households who are not making payments. However, we still include households who we know default at a point in time after our sample, because the payment savings apply up until they stop paying. For transparency, we also consider the marginal propensity to save out of payment shocks for an extended sample of households that includes those who default during our sample. Table B4 reports the results for this sample. The results are similar to the main sample, with a savings response of 6 percent (column 3). This response is lower than the savings response in the main sample and is consistent with the idea that there should be minimal differences in savings response for households who have no difference in payment savings, which is the case when neither variable rate nor tracker rate defaulters are making payments.

Table B4: The Marginal Propensity to Save out of payment shocks, including sample of defaulters

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | Savings | Log Savings | Δ Savings | Δ Log Savings | Savings | Log Savings | Δ Savings | Δ Log Savings |
| Cumulative Payment Difference | 0.059* (0.0230) | | | | 0.060* (0.0253) | | | |
| Log Cumulative Payment Difference | | 0.077* (0.0278) | | | | 0.092* (0.0332) | | |
| D.Cumulative Payment Difference | | | 0.057* (0.0234) | | | | 0.057* (0.0244) | |
| D.Log Cumulative Payment Difference | | | | 0.059** (0.0187) | | | | 0.061* (0.0243) |
| Observations | 151228 | 151213 | 140426 | 140411 | 151162 | 151147 | 140365 | 140350 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.903 | 0.906 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.903 | 0.905 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Individual FE | Yes | Yes | | | Yes | Yes | | |
| Quarter FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | | | | | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prob($\beta = 1$) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Note: Controls include current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, loan to income as of 2008 Q4, loan to value as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effects.

B.4 Differences at the start of the sample and over the entire sample, i.e. the long differences

Table B5 reports the savings response to a payment shock at the start of the sample and over the entire sample. The table includes two sets of results, each corresponding to a different time period: the start of the sample and the entire sample. The table shows that at the start of the sample, there is a small and statistically insignificant savings response of 2 percent. However, over the entire sample, there is a large savings response of 9 percent. Since there is no difference in savings at the start, this suggests that the savings of both groups were similar at the beginning. But over time, the tracker group saved about ten percent of the payment difference. The results over the entire sample are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table B5: The Marginal Propensity to Save out of payment shocks, at start of sample and long differences

| | Savings | | Log Savings | | Δ Savings 2011-14 | | Δ Log Savings 2011-14 | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Cumulative Payment Difference | 0.086 (0.0441) | 0.023 (0.0519) | | | | | | |
| Cumulative Payment Difference | | | 0.019*** (0.0050) | 0.019*** (0.0055) | | | | |
| Δ Cumulative Payment Difference 2011-14 | | | | | 0.091*** (0.0234) | 0.093*** (0.0266) | | |
| Δ Cumulative Payment Difference 2011-14 | | | | | | | 0.072** (0.0234) | 0.080** (0.0265) |
| Observations | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 | 10351 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.000 | 0.064 | 0.001 | 0.061 | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.001 | -0.002 |
| Controls \times Quarter FE | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes |

Note: Controls include current age, age at origination (both 5 year bins), income deciles, post code and year of origination of first lien, total outstanding balance as of 2008 Q4, loan to income as of 2008 Q4, loan to value as of 2008 Q4, all of which are interacted with quarter dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the fixed effects.

B.5 Deposits as a Share of Assets, by Liquid Asset Quartile

Table B6: Deposits as a Share of Assets, by Liquid Asset Quartile

| | Deposits | Share of Financial | Share of Real |
|--|----------|--------------------|---------------|
| Quartiles of Deposits (within Own w/ Mortgage) | | | |
| 1 | 146 | 78 | 0 |
| 2 | 1694 | 79 | 1 |
| 3 | 6497 | 79 | 3 |
| 4 | 45068 | 76 | 15 |
| Total | 13222 | 78 | 5 |

Note: Table reports deposits as a share financial and real assets. Sample is only households who own a home with a mortgage. Figures are weighted using survey weights. Source: Household Finance and Consumption Survey, European Central Bank.

C Appendix to Section 5: Model

C.1 Derivations

Equation (10) comes from applying the implicit function theorem to the consumption function $c(e, a; \tau)$

$$dc_t(e, a; \tau) = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{\partial c_t(e, a)}{\partial \tau_s} d\tau_s \quad (13)$$


Imposing that the shock is constant $d\tau_s = d\tau$ and lasts for k periods gives equation (10)

$$\frac{dc_t(e, a; \tau)}{d\tau} = \sum_{s=t}^k \frac{\partial c_t(e, a)}{\partial \tau_s}. \quad (14)$$

C.2 Appendix for Quantitative Results


This section presents additional results for the quantitative model. Figure C1 plots the policy functions for the model. Figure C2 plots the response of the model to a one time income shock. The relevant results are discussed in the main body.

Figure C1: Model's Policy Functions



Note: Plots show the policy functions for savings and consumption under the benchmark calibration that is reported in the main text.

Figure C2: Model Response to One Time Income Shock



Note: Plots show the response of the model to a one time income shock. The left panel shows the path of the transfer shock, i.e. the income shock. The middle panel shows the response of savings and the right panel shows the response of consumption. The MPC on impact 0.043.