MORTGAGE BORROWING LIMITS AND HOUSE PRICES

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July 2020
**Overview**

**Question:** How do mortgage limits affect borrowing and house prices?
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**Challenge:**
- Banks set limits endogenously
- Hard to disentangle limits changing versus other shocks
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Challenge:
- Banks set limits endogenously
- Hard to disentangle limits changing versus other shocks

This paper:
- New empirical evidence: Irish data and policy change in February 2015
2015 policy change introduces loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits:

Individual portfolios:
- When a borrowing constraint binds, do borrowers:
  - get a mortgage, but
    - buy a cheaper house
    - reduce leverage
  - or not buy a house

Equilibrium prices:
- If individuals buy a cheaper house, is this because
  - they buy a lower quality house
  - house prices fall in equilibrium

Regions with many above LTI threshold
Contribution

2015 policy change introduces loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits:

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- When a borrowing constraint binds, do borrowers:
  - get a mortgage, but
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Equilibrium prices:
- If individuals buy a cheaper house, is this because
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  - house prices fall in equilibrium
CONTRIBUTION

2015 policy change introduces loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits:

**Individual portfolios:**
- When a borrowing constraint binds, do borrowers:
  - get a mortgage, but
    - buy a cheaper house *(Poorer)* borrowers above LTI threshold
    - reduce leverage *(Richer)* borrowers above LTV threshold
  - or not buy a house

**Equilibrium prices:**
- If individuals buy a cheaper house, is this because
  - they buy a lower quality house
  - house prices fall in equilibrium *Regions with many above LTI threshold*
**Related Literature**

**Credit and housing**

- Mian and Sufi (2011); Attanasio, Bottazzi, Low, Nesheim, Wakefield (2012); Corbae and Quintin (2015); Landvoigt, Piazzesi and Schneider (2015); Favilukis, Ludvigson, Van Neuwerburgh (2017); Greenwald (2018); Greenwald and Guren (2019); Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2019); Kaplan, Mitman and Violante (2019); Boar, Gorea, Midrigan (2020).
  - Policy change tightened limits
  - LTI and LTV limits are different

**Macroprudential policy and borrowing limits**

- Lorenzoni (2007); Diamond and Kashyap (2016); Farhi and Werning (2016); Korinek and Simsek (2016); Acharya, Bergant, Crosignani, Eisert, and McCann (2020); Caballero and Simsek (2020).
  - Implementation of borrower based macro-pru policy
**Key difference between LTV and LTI limits**

Problem of an owner household:

\[
\max_{c,b,m,h} \sum_{t=0}^{T} \beta^t E_u(c_t, h_t)
\]

s.t. \[
c_t + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t} + \frac{m_{t+1}}{R_m} + p_t h_{t+1} = y_t + b_t + [m_t + p_t h_t] 1_h
\]

\[
b_{t+1} \geq 0
\]

LTV

\[
0 \geq m_{t+1} \geq -\psi_{ltv} p_t h_{t+1}
\]

LTI

\[
0 \geq m_{t+1} \geq -\psi_{lti} y_t
\]

- **Loan to value:** binds if cash on hand low relative to optimal house value
  - More savings allows more borrowing
- **Loan to income:** binds if income low relative to optimal house value
  - More savings does not allow more borrowing
1. Background to policy change

2. Impact of policy on borrowing

3. Impact on equilibrium prices
2015 policy change in Ireland

Context
▶ Ireland had large boom-bust in 2000s
▶ Policy introduced approx 18 months from bottom of cycle
▶ Unanticipated policy change

Google Trends

Loan to value
▶ First time buyers: 10% minimum downpayment
▶ Second or later buyers: 20% minimum downpayment
▶ Investors (buy to rent): 30% minimum downpayment

Loan to income
▶ Non-investors 3.5 times income limit

Exemptions
▶ Each bank allowed exceed the limits for up to 20% of new lending (by value)
▶ Re/uniFB01nancing/restructuring mortgages exempt
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1. Background to policy change
2. Impact of policy on borrowing
3. Impact on equilibrium prices
Data

Individual mortgage dataset
  - Source: Central Bank of Ireland
  - Purchase price, mortgage, deposit, income at origination
  - All mortgages except one large bank: no income reported before 2015

Question
  - How do the 2015 limits compare to LTV, LTI ratios in previous years?
Density of new mortgages by LTI and year

(A) 2006

(B) 2014

(C) 2018

Similar pattern for LTV: LTV
Comparing choices over time

Data: Construct a panel of cells
- Cells: age (7) x income (10) x buyer type (2) = 140 x years (7) ≈ 927
- % above threshold in each cell in 2014
- Average purchase price, mortgage, deposit
- Weight results by cell size (Blundell et. al., 1998)

Questions:
1. What groups had the most people above the threshold in pre-period?
2. How did choices—purchase price and leverage—change?
WHO was above threshold in pre-year (2014)

Each circle: is an age-income-type cell
Size of circle: count of cell
Line: weighted regression

Above LTI threshold:
- poorer
- younger by age
- less wealth HFCS

Diagram:
- Percent above LTI threshold before policy
- Income

Graph summary:
- Above LTI threshold:
  - poorer
  - younger by age
  - less wealth HFCS
WHO WAS ABOVE THRESHOLD IN PRE-YEAR (2014)

Above LTI threshold:
- poorer
- younger (by age)
- less wealth (HFCS)

Above LTV threshold:
- richer
- no age correlation
- more wealth

Each circle: is an age-income-type cell
Size of circle: count of cell
Line: weighted regression
Empirical strategy

Difference-in-difference event study regressions

\[ y_{it} = \sum_{k \neq 2014} \delta^{\text{LTI}}_k [\% \text{ above LTI threshold}_{i}^{2014} \times \mathbb{I}_{t=k}] + \sum_{k \neq 2014} \delta^{\text{LTV}}_k [\% \text{ above LTV threshold}_{i}^{2014} \times \mathbb{I}_{t=k}] + \tau_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it} \]

- **Outcome** \( y_{it} \)
  - purchase price, loan-to-value
- **Cell** \( i \), year \( t \)
- **“Treatment intensity”**: \% above threshold
- **Weight regressions by cell size (in 2014)**
- **Standard errors clustered by cell**
High LTI groups: $\delta_{k}^{LTI}$

$\rightarrow$ 15% lower price in 2015 for cells with 30% above LTI threshold versus those with 0%

(A) Purchase price (log)
**High LTI groups:** $\delta_{k}^{LTI}$

![Graphs showing impact on log price and leverage over years](image)

- **(A)** Purchase price (log)
- **(B)** Leverage (log ltv)
High LTV groups: $\delta_{k}^{LTV}$

(A) Purchase price (log)

(B) Leverage (log ltv)

→ 25% lower LTV in 2015 for cells with 50% above LTV threshold versus those with 0%
1. Background to policy change

2. Impact of policy on borrowing

3. Impact on equilibrium prices
**Data description**

**Regional dataset**
- Postcode level: 25 counties and 23 postcodes within Dublin
- Average price and rent indices *daft website*
- Mortgage: % above threshold in each postcode in 2014 Central Bank
- Within Dublin data limited to 2 banks

**Question:**
1. How did equilibrium prices change?

**Same empirical specification as before:**
1. Outcome: log price-to-rent ratio
Impact on log price-to-rent

Loan to income $\delta_k^{LTI}$

Loan to value $\delta_k^{LTV}$

LTV and LTI separately
Conclusion

Lessons from Irish micro data around 2015 policy change

1. Impact of policy on borrowing:
   ▶ High LTI groups: Decrease purchase price (and increase leverage)
     → 15% lower purchase price in group with 30% above LTI threshold
   ▶ High LTV groups: Decrease leverage (and increase price)
     → 25% lower loan-to-value in group with 50% above LTV threshold
   ▶ High LTV and LTI groups differ in net worth and income

On-going work: Explain these results in a quantitative lifecycle model.
Conclusion

Lessons from Irish micro data around 2015 policy change

1. Impact of policy on borrowing:
   - High LTI groups: Decrease purchase price (and increase leverage)
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   - High LTV groups: Decrease leverage (and increase price)
     → 25% lower loan-to-value in group with 50% above LTV threshold
   - High LTV and LTI groups differ in net worth and income

2. Impact of policy on house prices:
   - Price-rent ratio fell in areas where many people above LTI threshold
CONCLUSION

Lessons from Irish micro data around 2015 policy change

1. Impact of policy on borrowing:
   - **High LTI groups**: Decrease purchase price (and increase leverage)
     → 15% lower purchase price in group with 30% above LTI threshold
   - **High LTV groups**: Decrease leverage (and increase price)
     → 25% lower loan-to-value in group with 50% above LTV threshold
   - **High LTV and LTI groups**: differ in **net worth** and **income**

2. Impact of policy on house prices:
   - **Price-rent ratio fell** in areas where many people above LTI threshold

On-going work: Explain these results in a quantitative lifecycle model
THANK YOU

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APPENDIX
2015 Policy change in Ireland

Context
- Ireland had large boom-bust in 2000s
- Policy introduced approx 18 months from bottom of cycle
- Unanticipated policy change

Loan to value
- First time buyers: 10% minimum downpayment
  - 2015-2017: 10% on first €220,000; 20% on borrowing above €220,000
  - Post 2017: 10% on all borrowing
- Second or later buyers: 20% minimum downpayment
- Investors (buy to rent): 30% minimum downpayment

Loan to income
- Non-investors 3.5 times income limit

Exemptions
- All banks allowed exceed the cap in 10-20% of new lending
- Refinancing/restructuring mortgages exempt
Was the 2015 policy change expected?

**Figure:** Google searches for mortgage related terms in Ireland
Highly income-levered groups: $\delta_{k}^{LTI}$

- A 1pp increase in % above LTI threshold is associated with a 0.005 relative decline in log price paid in the year after policy.
- Comparing cells with 0 to 30% above LTI threshold: 0.15 log price difference.

Note: Regressions are weighted by cell size in the pre-treatment year (2014). Standard errors are clustered at the cell level.

(A) Price paid (log)

$$y_{it} = \sum_{k \neq 2014} \delta_{k}^{LTI}\%{\text{ above LTI threshold}}_{i}^{2014} \times 1_{t=k} + \tau_{t} + \gamma_{i} + \epsilon_{it}$$
Highly income-levered groups: $\delta_{k}^{LTI}$

(A) Price paid (log)

(B) Leverage (log ltv)

Note: Regressions are weighted by cell size in the pre-treatment year (2014). Standard errors are clustered at the cell level.

$$y_{it} = \sum_{k \neq 2014} \delta_{k}^{LTI} \left[ \% \text{ above LTI threshold}_{i}^{2014} \times I_{t=k} \right] + \tau_{t} + \gamma_{i} + \epsilon_{it}$$
Highly downpayment-levered groups: $\delta^LTV_k$

\[(A)\] Price paid (log)

\[(B)\] Leverage (log ltv)

Note: Regressions are weighted by cell size in the pre-treatment year (2014). Standard errors are clustered at the cell level.

\[y_{it} = \sum_{k \neq 2014} \delta^LTV_k \left[ \% \text{ above LTV threshold}_{i}^{2014} \times I_{t=k} \right] + \tau_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}\]
Timeline leading to mortgage limits

2000
“Celtic Tiger” begins

2007 (peak)
House prices up 220%
GDP up 50%

2008/09
Six main banks nationalised

2009
GDP trough down 11.3%

2010
Government bailout by IMF/EU/ECB

2013
House price trough down 54%

2013 onwards
“Celtic Phoenix” rises again

2012
Unemployment Peak 15.8%

2015
Borrowing limits introduced
Timeline leading to mortgage limits

- **2000**
  - “Celtic Tiger” begins

- **2007 (peak)**
  - House prices up 220%
  - GDP up 50%

- **2009**
  - GDP trough down 11.3%

- **2008/09**
  - Six main banks nationalised

- **2010**
  - Government bailout by IMF/EU/ECB

- **2012**
  - Unemployment Peak 15.8%

- **2013 onwards**
  - “Celtic Phoenix” rises again

- **2015**
  - Borrowing limits introduced

- **2019**
  - ECB calls for similar rules elsewhere
(A) Price paid

(B) Leverage (LTV)
High LTI groups - change 2014-15

(A) Purchase price

Remaining questions: Is change in slope statistically significant? Did it change in other years? Does it persist at different horizons?
High LTI groups - change 2014-15

(A) Purchase price

(B) Leverage (log LTV)

Remaining questions: Is change in slope statistically significant? Did it change in other years? Does it persist at different horizons?
**Downpayment-levered groups - year before**

**Figure:** Log changes in year **before** policy

![Scatter plots showing log changes in price paid and leverage (LTV) before policy](image)

**Notes:** Each circle is a cell, e.g. Age 30-34, €25k. The size of circle indicates the size (count) of the cell. The line is the fit from a weighted regression.
Downpayment-levered groups - year after

(A) Price paid

(B) LTV

Remaining questions: Is change in slope statistically significant? Did it change in other years? Does it persist at different horizons?
Empirical strategy

Difference in difference event study regressions

\[ y_{it} = \sum_{k \neq 2014Q3} \delta_{LTI}^k \left( \% \text{ above LTI threshold} \times 1_{t=k} \right) + \sum_{k \neq 2014Q3} \delta_{LTV}^k \left( \% \text{ above LTV threshold} \times 1_{t=k} \right) + \tau_t + \gamma_i + \mu_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \]

Notes:

- Outcome \( y_{it} \)
  - log price-to-rent,
- Postcode \( i \), year \( t \)
- Time trend \( \mu_{it} \)
- “Treatment intensity”: % above threshold
- Standard errors clustered at the postcode level
Recap so far

▶ Individual portfolio choice:

1. Income-levered groups: Decrease price paid (and increase leverage)

2. Downpayment-levered groups: Decrease leverage (and increase price)

▶ What might explain the differences: unclear so far!

1. Different groups affected and each have different resources to react with

2. Different effects of the constraints

▶ LTV constraint easier to save out of
Recap so far

▶ Individual portfolio choice:
  1. Income-levered groups: Decrease price paid (and increase leverage)
  2. Downpayment-levered groups: Decrease leverage (and increase price)

▶ What might explain the differences: unclear so far!
  1. Different groups affected
     ▶ and each have different resources to react with
  2. Different effects of the constraints
     ▶ LTV constraint easier to save out of
Further evidence

1. Fall in aggregate price-rent  
   Time series: Ireland, price-to-rent

2. Fall in Price expectations  
   Time series: price expectations

3. Fall in Price-rent relative to UK  
   Time series: international

4. Prices still growing  
   Time series: Ireland, prices and rents in levels
Differences in cash may reconcile responses

▶ Different responses could be due to differences: (1) assets/cash; (2) reaction to limits
▶ To check (1): Merge mean assets by age-income-type group from HFCS

Above LTI threshold:
▶ low net wealth
▶ poorer, younger by age

Above LTV threshold:
▶ high net wealth
▶ richer, no age correlation
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
Macroprudential tools are widely used

**Figure:** Loan-to-value caps in the European Union

Notes: European Stability and Risk Board, 2018. Shaded area indicates different policy for certain groups. E.g. Ireland has 90% LTV cap for first time buyers and 80% LTV cap for second time buyers.
Rules introduced in Ireland in 2015

Minimum downpayment (i.e. loan to value (LTV))

- First time buyers:
  - 10% up to €220,000;
  - 20% on *additional* house price above €220,000 (kink, removed in 2017)
- Second or later buyers: 20%
- Investors (buy to rent): 30%

Loan to income (LTI)

- Non-investors 3.5 times income

Exemptions

- Banks allowed exceed the cap in 10-20% of new lending
- Restructured/refinanced mortgages
- Negative equity borrowers
### Summary Statistics

**Figure:** Top and bottom five areas, by LTI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Mean LTI</th>
<th>Mean LTV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DUBLIN 16</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBLIN 5</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBLIN 13</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBLIN 9</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBLIN 24</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARLOW</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAYO</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>70.6</td>
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<td>LONGFORD</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROSCOMMON</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONEGAL</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Was the policy binding

Loan to income → (First and second+ time buyers)

Loan to value → (First time buyers)

(a) 2006

Notes: Density plots for new mortgages originated in a particular year. Histograms are weighted by the euro value of the loan at origination.
Was the policy binding

Loan to income →
(First and second+ time buyers)

Loan to value →
(First time buyers)

LTV: Second time and investors

(A) 2006
(B) 2014
(c) 2018

Notes: Density plots for new mortgages originated in a particular year. Histograms are weighted by the euro value of the loan at origination.
Was the policy binding

Loan to value → (Second+ time buyers)

Loan to value → (Investors)

(A) 2006  (B) 2014  (C) 2018

▶ back to histograms
Was the policy binding?

**Figure:** Mortgages conforming to 2015 policy

Notes: Figure shows the value of loans conforming to the 2015 mortgage rules before and after the introduction of the rules. Vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively.
Was the policy binding?

(A) Loan-to-income

(B) Loan-to-value

Figure: Mortgages conforming to 2015 policy

Notes: Figure shows the value of loans conforming to the 2015 LTI and LTV mortgage rules before and after the introduction of the rules. Vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively.
APPENDIX: INDIVIDUAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
WHO WAS ABOVE THRESHOLD IN YEAR PRE

Income

Age

(A) Loan to income  (B) Loan to value  (C) LTV or LTI
Who was above threshold in pre-year (2014)

- Each circle: is a cell e.g. Age 30-34, €25k
- Size of circle = size (count) of cell
- Line: weighted regression
- % above threshold is calculated in year prior to policy change (2014)
WHO WAS ABOVE THRESHOLD IN PRE-YEAR (2014)

- Each circle: is a cell
  e.g. Age 30-34, €25k
- Size of circle = size (count) of cell
- Line: weighted regression
- % above threshold
  is calculated in year prior to policy change (2014)
Robust to using logs or levels
IMPACT OF LTV ON MORTGAGES, PRICE AND DEPOSITS
COMPARING MORTGAGES, PRICE AND DEPOSITS
APPENDIX: AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
WHERE WAS ABOVE THRESHOLD IN PRE-YEAR

Price

Rent

Price-to-rent

(A) LTI

(B) LTV

(C) LTV or LTI
House price expectations

(A) CBI

(B) daft: Five year forecast

(C) daft: One year forecast

Notes: Left figure is from Acharya et al. (2018) using Central Bank of Ireland Expectations Survey. Vertical lines indicates the announcement date. Other figure shows the mean house price growth forecast from the daft expectations survey. Vertical lines indicates the announcement and implementation dates respectively. The left panel plots five year forecasts while the right panel plots one year forecasts.
Impact on price to rent (no time trend)

(A) Loan to income

(B) Loan to value
IMPACT ON PRICE-TO-RENT - LTV
IMPACT ON PRICE-TO-RENT- LTI
IMPACT ON LOG PRICES AND LOG RENTS

Loan to income:

Loan to value:

log price

log rent
IMPACT ON PRICES AND RENTS (LEVELS)

Loan to income:

Loan to value:

price

rent
**Impact on log price-to-rent**

(A) Loan to income $\delta_k^{LTI}$

(B) Loan to value $\delta_k^{LTV}$

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level.

\[
y_{it} = \sum_{k \neq 2014Q3} \delta_k \left[ \% \text{ above threshold}_{2014} + \mathbb{1}_{t=k} \right] + \tau_t + \gamma_i + \mu_i t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)
\]
Impact on price-to-rent conditionally - No Trends

Loan to income

Loan to value
Impact on rents and prices (log) - conditional

Loan to income:

Loan to value:

log price  log rent
IMPACT ON RENTS AND PRICES (LEVELS) - CONDITIONAL

Loan to income:

Loan to value:

price  rent
Price-rent ratio declined after policy

**Figure**: Price-to-rent ratio 2006-18

Figure shows the price-to-rent ratio nationally, 2007q1 to 2018q4. The monthly rent is annualised before calculating the ratio. The two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT.
Comparing across countries

Figure: Price-to-rent ratio 2012-18

Notes: Figure shows the price-to-rent nationally in Ireland and the four countries of the United Kingdom year-on-year growth rate in average price and rent nationally, 2012q1 to 2018q2. The ONS started some of the series after the 2006 and these are presented from their first available date. The first two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT (Ireland), ONS (UK).
COMPARING ACROSS SEGMENTS

**Figure:** Price-to-rent ratio in high and low constrained segments

Notes: Figure shows the price-to-rent ratio in high and low counties for both the LTV and LTI constraints. High (and low) counties are defined as the top (and bottom) half of counties on the respective metric. The first two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT.
PRICE AND LOAN-TO-INCOME (LTI) POSITIVELY CORRELATED

**Figure:** Average prices and rents by LTI and LTV rank in 2014

**Notes:** Figure shows average price and rent by LTI and LTV ranks. Data is from 2014 and at the county level. Source: DAFT, Central Bank of Ireland.
Prices did not rise as much as rents

Figure: House prices and rents 2006-18

(A) Levels

(B) Growth rates

Notes: Right figure shows the price and rent indices nationally, 2007q1 to 2018q4. Left figure shows the growth rate (log change) in the same indices. The two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT.
Comparing across countries 2006-18

**Figure:** Price-to-rent ratio 2006-18

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Comparing across segments 2006-18

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## Difference Across Segments - Regression

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<td>0.008*</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
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<td>-0.134**</td>
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<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
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<td>(-0.96)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table shows the two year change in price and rents after the policy change, $\Delta p_{t+2,t}$ and $\Delta r_{t+2,t}$, regressed on the mean loan-to-value and loan-to-income in the county in the year prior to the policy change, $LTV_t$ and $LTI_t$. Unit of observation is a county. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Stars indicate $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, and $p < 0.001$. 

[back](#)
**Time series evidence - growth rates**

**Figure:** Growth rate of prices and rents before and after announcement

Notes: Figure shows the year-on-year growth rate in average price and rent nationally, 2007q1 to 2018q4. The first two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT.
Comparing across segments - growth rates

Figure: Growth rate of prices and rents by market segment

Notes: Figure shows the year-on-year growth rate in average price and rent nationally, 2007q1 to 2018q4. Vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. The third vertical line denotes the date when the kink in the LTV requirement was removed. Source: DAFT.
**Comparing across segments**

**Figure:** Price-to-rent ratio in high and low constrained segments

Notes: Figure shows the price-to-rent ratio in high and low counties for both the LTV and LTI constraints. High (and low) counties are defined as the top (and bottom) half of counties on the respective metric. The first two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT.
Source: Acharya Et.Al. (2018) and Central Bank of Ireland Expectations Survey. Notes: Vertical lines indicates the announcement date.
Bellman equation

Each consumer chooses to rent or buy:

\[ V[b, m, h, a, y] = \max \{ V^{\text{rent}}, V^{\text{buy}} \} \]

Where the value of buying is:

\[ V^{\text{buy}}[b, m, h, a, y] = \max_{b', m', h'} u(c, s) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{y'} V_{a+1}[b', m', h', a', y'] \]

\[ \text{s.t.} \quad c + \frac{b'}{R} + \frac{m'}{Rm} + ph' = y + b + [m + ph] \mathbb{1}_h \]

\[ b' \geq 0 \quad s = \phi h' \]

\[ 0 \geq m' \geq -\psi_{ltv} ph' \]

\[ 0 \geq m' \geq -y \psi_{lti} \]
And the value of renting is:

\[
V^{rent}[b, m, h, a, y] = \max_{b', h'} u(c, s) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{y'} V_{a+1}[b', 0, 0, a', y']
\]

s.t.

\[
c + \frac{b'}{R} + rh' = y + b + [m + p \cdot h] \mathbb{1}_h
\]

\[
b' \geq 0 \quad s = h'
\]
Policy functions: renter with three income states

Figure: Policy function for renter at beginning of period
**Policy functions: owner**

**Figure:** Policy function for owner at beginning of period
Income shock estimates

Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan and Song 2016
Model 5 - Table A 2: AR(1)

\[ \rho = 0.993 \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)
\[ \sigma_\epsilon = 0.303 \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Kaplan, Mitman and Violante (2019)

\[ \rho = 0.97 \]  \hspace{1cm} (4)
\[ \sigma_\epsilon = 0.20 \]  \hspace{1cm} (5)
Comparing DAFT and OECD datasets

**Figure:** Growth rate of prices and rents before and after announcement

Notes: Figure shows the year-on-year growth rate in average price and rent nationally, 2007q1 to 2018q4. The first two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT.
COMPARING RENTS: DAFT, OECD AND CSO DATASETS

Figure: Growth rate of prices and rents before and after announcement

Notes: Figure shows the year-on-year growth rate in average price and rent nationally, 2007q1 to 2018q4. The first two vertical dashed lines show the announcement and implementation dates respectively. Source: DAFT.
Purpose of a model

Calibrate: partial equilibrium life-cycle model w/housing
  ► Aim to match cross sectional facts in pre-period (2014)
  ► Impose policy change in post-period (2015-)

Shed light on
  ► Mechanisms: expectations, constraints
  ► Tradeoffs: excessive savings, rental markets
  ► Modelling assumptions: indivisibility of housing; role of rental markets

Counterfactual policies
Clearing rental and sales markets

- Initialise distribution using HCFS
- Use bisection method to solve for linear prices, $\bar{p}, \bar{r}$ s.t. $\sum_i h_r^i = \hat{h}_r$, $\sum_i h_s^i = \hat{h}_s$
- Intuition: Rents pin down total demand; prices pin down ownership share.

1. $\bar{p} = \infty$
2. Find $\bar{r}$ s.t. $\sum_i h_r^i + \sum_i h_s^i = \hat{h}_r + \hat{h}_s$

3. Fix $\bar{r}$, find $\bar{p}$ s.t. $\sum_i h_s^i = \hat{h}_s$

4. Check $\bar{r}$ still satisfies 2, otherwise iterate 2 and 3.
Market clearing with linear prices

Figure: Excess demand under divisible and indivisible housing